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Regulatory mandates for transparency in philanthropic giving are often touted
as an unmitigated good. Private foundations have long been obligated to pro-
vide certain types of transparency—the types that are required by the federal
tax system and, to a lesser extent, by state laws aimed at maintaining the in-
tegrity of donor intent. But today’s calls for more transparency argue that it is
a good unto itself—that transparency is needed to ensure that philanthropy
serves “public purposes,” that transparency will counteract a purported “power
asymmetry” between donors and grantees, and that it is necessary to evaluate
philanthropic effectiveness. In this book, John Tyler critically scrutinizes both
legal and practical aspects of these rationales for increased transparency. He
also challenges calls for government intervention, including those that seem
to presume the legitimacy of transparency as a fundamental principle in itself
instead of a dependent value in service to other objectives that must them-
selves be legitimate. Along the same lines, he dissects the most frequently as-
serted objectives for government mandates and reveals deeply rooted,
potentially insurmountable problems with the practical pursuit of those objec-
tives. Tyler argues that American philanthropy is at its best when donors, with
their wide range of charitable purposes, can freely choose to employ the kinds
of transparency that enable them to accomplish their goals. To this end, he also
offers thoughtful advice about how foundations might, in pursuit of their mis-
sion, provide measured transparency on a voluntary basis.
John Tyler is general counsel and corporate secretary at the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation.
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If people could be enticed to relinquish their privacy rights in exchange
for financial or other incentives, and if governments or corporations
could form their own surveillance and behavior monitoring networks
at will, the citizenry would, over time, be relinquishing its autonomy
and democratic powers to the government and other entities.
—John Henry Clippinger
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Preface
Engaging in philanthropy, as a donor or manager, involves hard work
and hard choices. But recent years have seen new difficulties for phi-
lanthropists, in the form of challenges to the legitimacy of private phi-
lanthropy itself. Philanthropy and philanthropists are said to ignore
the poor, abuse the privileges that our tax system accords to charity
and donors, and deny the American public its proper authority in al-
locating philanthropic funds. For individuals who have chosen to incur
the costs of engaging in philanthropy, these charges are extremely dis-
turbing.
The Philanthropy Roundtable, because of its commitment to pri-
vate philanthropy in America, has given a high priority to examining
these charges.
Whether called attacks, threats, defenses, discussions, debates, di-
alogue, conversations, recommendations, or suggestions, public dis-
course about philanthropy over the last decade and more may be
characterized in part as a search for definition of how philanthropy
serves and should serve, and in some cases ultimately express, Amer-
ica’s social, economic, and political systems. That discourse has, at
times, been impaired by ambiguity of language and terminology and
lack of discipline concerning principles. 
In America, disagreements about values, strategies, priorities, and
their relative importance are to be expected and even encouraged. It is
through such disagreements that we often “search.” It is to protect
these disagreements and the progress they produce that our nation was
and is grounded in principles and processes that foster checks and bal-
ances, federalism, separation of powers, self-determination, and liberty.
Philanthropy should not be immune from such disagreements, but nei-
ther should it be a mere pawn subject to public winds and whims. Phil-
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anthropy’s relevance to our nation is too important, and its potential
contributions to our future too valuable, to allow it to be relegated to
marionette status. Therefore, the current disagreements about Ameri-
can philanthropy deserve greater clarity about guiding principles, more
disciplined respect for roles and contributions, and less ambiguity
about terminology. 
It was with these objectives in mind that my colleague Evelyn
Brody and I accepted The Philanthropy Roundtable’s 2008 invitation
to write about the legal foundations of an important part of the cur-
rent debate—the question of whether foundation and charity assets
may properly be characterized as “public money.” The question was,
in one sense, merely a matter of terminology, but the words had too
often begun to be applied literally, arguing these assets were public
money in the strictest sense and, thus, should be subject to government
or quasi-government control. What was a seemingly innocuous seman-
tic matter had been elevated to one of material consequence.1 The
Roundtable’s invitation resulted in a monograph (now available in a
second edition), a supplemental law review article, and various essays
and presentations that debunked the “public money” myth and, we
1. For instance, the “public money” concept—or simply the fact of the charitable tax exemp-
tion and deduction—has been used to advocate the imposition of mandatory ratios on the
allocation of philanthropic funds and racial or gender quotas for board composition. For
example, at a panel discussion in 2008, the then-head of Greenlining Institute, John Gam-
boa, remarked, “[W]e should have a partial share of those tax dollars that are going to
subsidize those foundations to give back to our community.” John Gamboa, “Mandating
Multicultural Munificence?” (transcript, Washington: Hudson Institute, 2008). The “public
money” concept has also been used to justify imposing various requirements on foundation
boards—including public representation, open meetings and decision-making, public input
on decisions about grants and strategies, or even outright deference to and implementation
of such input. See Leslie Lenkowsky, “‘Sunshine’ Laws Also Produce Some Shadows,”
Chronicle of Philanthropy, April 23, 1998. These types of demands are not new. David A.
Lipton, “Significant Private Foundations and the Need for Public Selection of Their
Trustees,” Virginia Law Review 64 (1978): 779; and Lawrence M. Stone, “The Charitable
Foundation: Its Governance,” Law and Contemporary Problems 39, no. 1 (1975): 57. For-
tunately, these intrusions have generally been resisted by policymakers, but the need for
ongoing vigilance and demonstrated value remains. 
9hope, contributed to the dialogue about the philanthropic and chari-
table sectors.2
Another, related, charge in the debate over the legitimacy of private
philanthropy is the contention that philanthropic organizations are in-
sufficiently “transparent” to public view. The present monograph ex-
amines this charge.
A major topic of contention in the current discourse has been the
question of how much and what kind of transparency, openness, or
disclosure should be required of philanthropic enterprises. Discussion
of this question has been particularly confused and hampered by the
absence of linguistic, theoretical, and even practical clarity. The goals
of this monograph are similar to those of the “not public money”
monograph: to consider ways in which the concept of “transparency”
has been used in discussions about philanthropy and to propose an an-
alytical framework for the term and the concepts it denotes. The hope
is that this monograph can contribute to optimizing the potential of
philanthropy by facilitating better understanding of how the term
“transparency” and its underlying concepts have been generally applied
to philanthropy,3 including ways that both threaten and confuse. An-
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2. See Evelyn Brody and John Tyler, How Public is Private Philanthropy? Separating Reality from
Myth, 2nd ed. (Washington: The Philanthropy Roundtable, 2012), available at http://www.phil-
anthropyroundtable.org/files/Public_Private%20Monograph_high%20res_Final.pdf; and Eve-
lyn Brody and John Tyler, “Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public is
Private Philanthropy?” Chicago-Kent Law Review 85, no. 2 (June 2010), available at
http://www.cklawreview.com/wp-content/uploads/vol85no2/Brody.pdf. 
3. Throughout this monograph, “philanthropy” is generally used to refer to grantmakers, in-
cluding individuals who make charitable gifts deductible under Internal Revenue Code (the
“Code” or “I.R.C.”) section 170 and private and community foundations that operate as
nonprofit corporations under state law and are tax exempt under Code section 501(c)(3),
whether grantmaking or operating. This monograph does not treat philanthropic efforts
grounded in strategies outside this regimen—strategies that are becoming more common,
as evidenced by the innovations of the various Milken enterprises, the Omidyar Network,
Open Society Foundations, and others who choose to use the American foundation structure
as one form among several within a broader strategy for pursuing philanthropic objectives.
George McCully advocates a definition of “philanthropy” that does not limit itself to funders
but implements the classical definition of the word, to encompass a broader range of exempt,
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other goal is to increase appreciation for the complex nature of the
topic, the need to respect and balance competing principles, the use-
fulness of relative degrees of transparency, and the benefits of disci-
plined decision-making that takes into account financial, opportunity,
and other costs. 
Ultimately, it is my hope that this monograph and discussions of it
can help lead to a clearer definition of and appreciation for the role of
philanthropy in America’s social, economic, and political systems, par-
ticularly as transparency can facilitate or impede those roles and
strengthen philanthropy’s contributions to those systems.
Transparency in Philanthropy
charitable, and voluntary associations. George McCully, Philanthropy Reconsidered: Private
Initiatives, Public Good, Quality of Life (Bloomington, Ind.: AuthorHouse, 2008), 1–3. The
narrower definition used here is merely a matter of convenience and a knowing compromise
of the disciplined use of terms and rhetoric that both he and I support.
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Introduction
Discussions about transparency in philanthropy have been going on
since the days of Julius Rosenwald, Andrew Carnegie, John D. Rocke-
feller, and J. Howard Pew. On one hand, Rosenwald and Carnegie
seemed to embrace degrees of openness if for no other reason than the
fact that their modus operandi required communities to raise money to
supplement funds which they committed for building schools and li-
braries. Julius Rosenwald wrote about and encouraged the giving away
of wealth during one’s lifetime. Carnegie did the same, although some
suggest that Carnegie wanted “publicity” rather than openness in order
to rehabilitate the harm to his reputation attributable to decisions made
while building the railroad and steel industries. Rockefeller and Pew, on
the other hand, seemed to desire less or no visibility for their philan-
thropy during their lives because of religious convictions and a desire
for privacy. In each case, the discussions and decisions were essentially
private, even though both Carnegie and Rosenwald publicly sought to
influence how their peers and legacies approached philanthropy. 
More recent discussions about transparency in philanthropy have ex-
panded well beyond donors and their advisors. Now, the conversation
occurs across a much broader spectrum that includes, and is even dom-
inated by, policymakers and regulators at both the state and federal levels
along with academics, grantees, journalists, bloggers, commentators, as-
sociations, watchdog groups, data miners, tweeters, Facebookers, and
others. While such an observation suggests a pervasiveness of dialogue,
it may be that donors, boards, and managers of many philanthropic en-
terprises have not engaged enough in the discussions, whether those that
affect the field broadly or even with regard to their specific organizations. 
Each of these sets of conversations—among the great industrial-age
philanthropists, policymakers, media, the public, foundations, etc.—
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has much in common, particularly in that they all involve notions of
transparency, openness, or disclosure. However, involving “notions”
of transparency is not the same as those “notions” having commonality
or being the same. The failure to recognize and address that distinction
can be a significant problem for the field, for individual entities and
their donors, leaders, and managers, and even for those who want to
inspire transparency. 
More specifically, it is likely that nearly all or at least most people
would agree that there is value to be gained from degrees of trans-
parency in philanthropy. However, that broad agreement collapses
when confronted by the all-important details and realities of implemen-
tation in practice. Among these details are questions about what is ex-
pected to be open (e.g., board meetings, decision-making meetings,
individual grant assessments, etc.), as determined by whom (e.g., gov-
ernment or private persons or entities), to what degrees or with what
limitations, to what ends (e.g., compliance with tax treatment, resource
redistribution, better understanding the charitable sector, etc.), and
with what consequences (e.g., intended or not, financial and other costs
to foundations, grantees, and society, etc.). Of course, even that list of
questions is nowhere near exhaustive. 
The topic of transparency is complicated, deserves further analysis,
and should not be engaged without clarity about presumptions being
made by participants in the dialogue. For instance, it should not be pre-
sumed that those who advocate generally for transparency in philan-
thropy have vetted whether the consequences and costs of their
positions are generally acceptable. It also should not be presumed that
those who appear to oppose the concept of transparency are not instead
alarmed about the details of implementation and various consequences
and costs of doing so, particularly if those details, consequences and
costs have been neglected in the first place. In other words, what might
seem wholesome on the surface may not be in practice and what might
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seem obstructionist might be striving for solutions to the practical im-
pediments to greater transparency. The opponents might be looking
for ways in which transparency can work within various limits and
boundaries without otherwise unacceptable costs and consequences to
the capacity of philanthropy to fulfill its responsibilities in our social,
economic, and political systems. 
As a result of the lack of clarity and the too-frequent misjudgments,
misunderstandings, or mischaracterizations, what seems to have
emerged is more of an unfortunate cacophony than harmonic disso-
nance—much less perfect harmony. 
There have been few, if any, thorough attempts to truly analyze and
focus on issues relating to calls for greater transparency in philan-
thropy. The issues are important enough to philanthropy and the cor-
responding role of government that we need more study of the legal
bases for and limits to such calls, the legitimacy and deficiencies of var-
ious other efforts to justify greater transparency in philanthropy, and
reasons why philanthropic enterprises should voluntarily pursue de-
grees of transparency more aggressively than is required by law. The
presumptions that have been filling that void are becoming increasingly
troublesome, particularly as legislators and regulators at federal and
state levels have been viewing philanthropy with certain (sometimes
mistaken) preconceptions and are increasingly acting on those views.
Also contributing to the concern are calls for greater openness from
within the charitable sector that too frequently are based on presump-
tions that are unstated or that have not been appropriately or thor-
oughly vetted for their grounding or consequences. Such calls, if
allowed to permeate discussions and thinking without challenge or dis-
ciplined assessment, then shape public opinion and policy, with atten-
dant consequences and costs. 
This monograph is an attempt to begin filling that vacancy. The
monograph asserts that it is appropriate for the government to require
Transparency in Philanthropy
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certain degrees and types of transparency to achieve specified legitimate
objectives. It also advocates that foundations should do more to vol-
untarily pursue openness in ways that exceed current legal mandates
and that are consistent with and of benefit to each foundation’s partic-
ular mission and operations. This monograph also critically scrutinizes
calls for increased transparency more generally, including the common
(and sometimes intentional) lack of clarity about whether the pleas are
merely encouraging voluntary private decision-making or are demand-
ing government-imposed standards. The monograph challenges those
latter calls for government intervention, including those that seem to
presume the legitimacy of transparency as a fundamental principle in
itself instead of a dependent value in service to other objectives that
must themselves be legitimate. Along the same lines, the monograph
dissects the most frequently asserted objectives for government man-
dates and reveals deeply rooted, potentially insurmountable problems
with the practical pursuit of those objectives. 
As such, this monograph is an effort to encourage advocates of
greater transparency in philanthropy to be more disciplined and clear
in their assertions. It is an attempt to embolden opponents—or even
those who just want to avoid unintended and damaging consequences
to philanthropy in America—to be wary, to ask questions, and to chal-
lenge stated positions about philanthropic transparency. In these ways,
both can help ensure that the sector is treated with the discipline and
clarity that it deserves and that is required for it to fulfill its responsi-
bilities to our social, economic, and political systems. Ultimately, the
intent of this monograph is to allow the conversation to proceed in
meaningful ways that strengthen philanthropy and its service to our
nation and culture. There are degrees to which more transparency in
philanthropy can be pursued, promoted, and actually achieved if we
remove the threats that are inherent in too many of the presumptions
and if consequences of various courses of action are more completely
John Tyler
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understood so we can embrace those approaches that are beneficial
and minimize or eliminate those that are likely to cause damage. 
It is one thing for Andrew Carnegie to communicate his views on
philanthropy, including his expectations of transparency, and to try to
persuade John D. Rockefeller to be more open or J. P. Morgan to enter
the field with greater vigor. It is quite another thing to suggest that
Carnegie should have been permitted to actually dictate and determine
either peer’s approach to philanthropy or transparency. I doubt that he
would have tolerated such a view any more than he would have per-
mitted his peers to dictate and determine his approaches to philan-
thropy or transparency. All these individuals decided such things for
themselves based on the processes and guidance they chose to deploy.
In formalizing the structure of their philanthropic enterprises as they
did, they also chose to depend on their successor boards, managers,
and leaders to do likewise for their respective legacy institutions. As
with the original benefactors, successive institutions, other philanthro-
pies, and the field itself are responsible for making those decisions they
believe best serve donor intent, programmatic missions, and the law—
including the law as it relates to degrees of transparency and openness.
Transparency in Philanthropy
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Chapter I
Philanthropic Transparency
and Accountability to 
Government
American philanthropy became an integral part of the nation’s fabric long
before the founding of the American republic in 1776.1 But organized phi-
lanthropy as we know it today, made up of enterprises created specifically
to pursue identifiable charitable objectives through grantmaking, is a
much more recent phenomenon. Over the past century, philanthropy has
evolved, particularly philanthropy by tax-exempt foundations. Among
the key factors driving this evolution have been an unparalleled generosity
of human spirit, visionary donors, changing social needs, an increasingly
interconnected world, and, of course, changes in the tax code. 
There is debate about whether the most recent steps in that evolu-
tion have made foundations more homogenous and marginalized or
whether they have helped make them more effective and efficient con-
tributors to society. There is agreement, though, that many foundations
have become increasingly formal and, at least among foundations with
larger staffs, professionalized.2 Whether or not these have been univer-
sally good developments is a subject for another time. 
1. See Paul Arnsberger et al., “A History of the Tax Exempt Sector: An SOI Perspective,”
Statistics of Income Bulletin (Winter 2008): 105; and Chauncey Belknap, “The Federal
Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Underlying Policy,”
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs: Research Papers 4 (Washington:
U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1977): 2025, 2027–30. 
2. There is a danger of over-generalizing the description of the management and operations
of exempt foundations and neglecting their many permutations. Most foundations are
not professionally managed. But the larger foundations have increasingly become staffed
and managed by “professionals,” and there has been correspondingly increased attention
to the influence of this change on philanthropy and its role in American society.
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There seems to be general agreement that among the
factors shaping modern exempt foundations have been
changes in the tax treatment of their operations and
their donors’ contributions. Although the federal income
tax was instituted in the early 20th century, the late
1960s began formalizing a view of the tax code not just
as a way to address tax treatment of private philan-
thropy but also as a means of interjecting other types
of accountability and government presence (at least for
some) into philanthropic operations and outcomes—an
effort that has only increased in more recent years. 
Since the tax code excludes or subtracts foundation income and do-
nations from taxable income, it is arguably reasonable as a matter of
public policy to require foundations and their donors, like other recip-
ients of tax benefits, to substantiate their claims to these benefits and
their compliance with applicable conditions. Such is the nature of the
tax treatment compact, which thus provides the most compelling basis
for any requisite legal accountability and for which non-compliance
can carry concrete consequences. 
Noticeably missing from the compact is the vesting of affirmative
rights in or other empowerment of the public or government to govern
and manage the participating enterprises. To the contrary, these stan-
dards, when properly applied, set barriers to such interference, except
and only when necessary and appropriate to enforce the conditions of
the tax treatment compact. However, tax treatment has given rise to
increasingly regular demands for more transparency as a way to force
the pace and direction of further change unrelated to tax policy so as
to redefine philanthropy and its relationship to our social, economic,
and political systems. Some of these demands are based on quid pro
Transparency in Philanthropy
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quo and “stakeholder” theories, neither of which withstands scrutiny
(as discussed below), to support more expansive approaches to ac-
countability and transparency.
In addition to being accountable for tax treatment, foundations and
charities also may be accountable for complying with conditions that
donors legally attach to their contributions. Operationally, this accounta-
bility to donors most commonly manifests itself in responding to the state
Attorney General or other chief charity official of the state charged with
enforcing donor intent, but also can involve engaging with the courts. 
A. Accountability to Law and the Tax
Code: The Four Conditions that Underlie
the Tax Treatment Compact 
As a matter of tax and public policy, foundation income is generally ex-
empt from federal income tax.3 Foundations also are usually exempt
from sales, property, income, and other taxes imposed by states and lo-
calities. In addition, federal and state tax policies allow donors to take
charitable deductions from their income, gift, and estate taxes for con-
tributions to foundations, subject to restrictions.4 In return, donors and
those who govern and manage foundations accept conditions for which
there is accountability and reasonable degrees of transparency. There are
questions, however, about how much transparency or intrusion the com-
pact can justify. For instance, does it support reaching beyond the explicit
John Tyler
3. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). However, Code section 512 requires these organizations to pay tax on
their unrelated business income. In addition, unless they fall within one of the exceptions
in Code section 509(a), section 501(c)(3) organizations are treated as “private founda-
tions.” As such, they are required under Code section 4940 to pay an annual excise tax
on their net investment income. Thus, private foundations, strictly speaking, are not
wholly tax-exempt. The “tax-exempt” label is an example of the general lack of discipline
in the language applied to the philanthropic sector. Still, “tax-exempt” is a commonly un-
derstood label used to describe these organizations, so this monograph will use it as well. 
4. In general, under Code section 170, donors may deduct charitable contributions to private
foundations in amounts up to 30 percent of their adjusted gross incomes. The correspon-
ding figure for contributions to public charities is 50 percent.
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conditions of the compact itself, whose conditions are discussed next?
Or should the analysis be re-positioned as one of quid pro quo and, thus,
be used to rationalize government assessments of effectiveness?
Long before the institution of the federal income tax, the American
social, economic, and political systems seeded countless efforts to raise
and distribute money for charitable purposes. These activities became
more complicated about a hundred years ago when Congress imposed
a federal income tax, then had to figure out how to address charitable
organizations and contributions within the context of the new tax. 
Without declaring—or even hinting at—whether it was excluding
charitable income and donations from the tax base altogether or
whether it was including them in the tax base but reducing or elimi-
nating the amount of tax due, Congress dealt with the situation by in-
troducing charitable exemptions and deductions for donors who have
truly given up the right to use the funds for their unilaterally directed
consumption. For purposes of both the exemption and deductibility,
the recipient organizations must satisfy the four core conditions that
are the heart of the tax treatment compact:5
1. Foundations must be organized and operated for chari-
table purposes. The first condition has two parts: The entities
must be both organized and operated for certain purposes. First,
501(c)(3) entities must be explicitly organized to further purposes
Transparency in Philanthropy
5. Peter Frumkin, Trouble in Foundationland: Looking Back, Looking Ahead (Washington:
Hudson Institute, 2004), 14. Foundation accountability arises from the tax deduction.
Foundations are accountable to act “within the law and ethics of good grantmaking.”
Richard Marker, “Public Role in Foundation Decision Making,” Wise Philanthropy, Sep-
tember 16, 2007 . The explicitness of these conditions should not be overstated, however.
As Belknap observed, to treat the compact as the result of a quid pro quo transaction “is
to state the terms of a bargain which we have not before us. There is no direct evidence
that such a bargain was ever made. The process of exempting these private institutions
developed imperceptibly, subtly. It was a spontaneous process, leaving no trace of its ori-
gins or immediate development.” Belknap, “Federal Income Tax Exemption,” 2030. 
21
that the Internal Revenue Code identifies as charitable, religious, ed-
ucational, directed to the pursuit of scientific research or literacy, or
otherwise exempt.6 Note that these purposes are distinct from gov-
ernment’s responsibilities for the “public good” writ large, although
there is certainly some overlap. The distinction is explored further
in chapter II. The second part of the first condition requires that rel-
evant entities actually operate in furtherance of such purposes.7 That
is, foundations and public charities must conduct their activities and
use their assets for charitable purposes. Together, these dual pieces
of the first condition ensure that both organizational form and op-
erational substance are united towards charitable ends.
2. Foundations must not use funds for private benefit. The
second core condition is that foundations and public charities may
not use their assets to further private purposes.8 Logically, requiring
that these entities be organized and operated exclusively for chari-
table purposes might necessarily exclude providing benefits to pri-
vate interests, but stating the “no private benefit” condition
separately serves independent objectives. For instance, a foundation
would satisfy the first condition—being organized and operated ex-
clusively for exempt purposes—if it supported only the religious
activities or evangelizing efforts of the donor’s family members, ear-
marked educational scholarships for the donor’s relatives, or en-
John Tyler
6. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). Among indicia of being so organized, the governing documents must
describe the exempt purposes that it will pursue and state that, upon its liquidation, its
assets will be distributed to another charitable exempt organization or the government.
7. Ibid.
8. The prohibition on private benefit is not absolute. For instance, there is direct and implicit statu-
tory authority for providing reasonable compensation to personnel (I.R.C. § 4941) and making
other reasonable payments for goods and services that are incidental to the foundation’s pursuing
its exempt purposes. In this monograph, the term “private benefit” and the legal concept it de-
notes should be understood as permitting such compensation and payments. A foundation is
also permitted—even expected—to invest its corpus so as to maintain or increase its size. 
22
Transparency in Philanthropy
gaged in other types of exempt activities narrowly tailored to ben-
efit the donor or another private interest. Such focused uses, even
though charitable and meeting the first condition, would further
private purposes in violation of this second condition. 
Thus, this second condition does not merely restate the first; it
broadens and complements it. But the second condition has limits.
It is properly understood in the negative; that is, “no private bene-
fit.” It should not be misconstrued as requiring philanthropies to
undertake the affirmative pursuit of something called “public ben-
efit.” The Code and the tax compact require charities and founda-
tions to pursue charitable, exempt purposes, not “public benefit.”
As discussed in chapter II, section B, such purposes are a discrete
subset of “public benefit” and “social good” that further particular
roles in our American systems rather than being synonymous with
the same concepts. The degrees of accountability and transparency
that may properly be required of foundations should connect di-
rectly to this specific role. When government exceeds or is incon-
sistent with a proper understanding of the second condition, it
impermissibly crosses boundaries that are crucial in order for phi-
lanthropy to fulfill its roles in our society, economy, and politics.9
3. Foundations must not engage in impermissible lobbying
or political activity. The third core condition of the tax treatment
compact is that philanthropic or charitable organizations and their
funds must not be used for impermissible lobbying or to intervene,
directly or indirectly, in a political campaign for or against any can-
didate for public office. This condition limits the direct influence of
charities and nearly eliminates that of foundations on our nation’s
legislative processes. It also prohibits their engagement in our elec-
9. See Brody and Tyler, How Public Is Private Philanthropy? 73–76; and Brody and Tyler,
“Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy,” 614.
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toral processes. These restrictions arose for a variety of policy rea-
sons, which are beyond the scope of this monograph. It should be
added that these reasons may soon be challenged in light of recent
Supreme Court decisions.10 For our purposes, it suffices to say that
this restriction supports certain degrees of government-mandated
openness and disclosures to ensure compliance with its provisions
(although it is difficult to prove a negative). As with the first two
conditions, this third core condition does not vest power or author-
ity in government or the public to do anything but impose conse-
quences for non-compliance. 
4. Foundations must following reporting rules. A fourth core
condition of the compact requires foundations and charities to file
information returns with the IRS—Forms 990PF and 990, respec-
tively, and Form 990T for business income that is unrelated to char-
itable purposes.11 Federal law also directs foundations and charities
to provide copies of their information returns to anyone who asks
and to state Attorneys General.12 The law further mandates that
these enterprises make available to the public on request their ap-
plications for exemption and the IRS letters acknowledging the
same. Several states have similar filing and openness requirements.
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10. See Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Under the First
Amendment, government may not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s
corporate identity. In order to extend the holding of Citizens United to exempt corporations
such as private foundations or public charities, the Court would have to overturn or dis-
tinguish Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983). The
staff of Sen. Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa), a member of the Senate Committee on Finance,
has released a paper proposing a study of this issue. See Theresa Pattara and Sean Barnett,
“Memo to Senator Grassley: Review of Media-Based Ministries,” January 6, 2011. 
11. In addition to general financial information, private foundations must provide specific
items of information including the following: each grant made during the preceding year,
separately reported details of grants or activities conducted under the “expenditure respon-
sibility” rules, investment transactions, and compensation of officers, directors, highest-
compensated employees, and parties with contracts totaling more than $5,000. 
12. I.R.C. §§ 6033, 6104.
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This last condition uses openness and disclosure as a means of
requiring philanthropies to demonstrate compliance with the other
conditions of the tax treatment compact. Such disclosure is an un-
usual approach to tax policy; that is, no other taxpaying persons
who receive tax-favored treatment are subject to similar require-
ments. Businesses and individuals that declare any number of de-
ductions and credits are not thereby required to make their tax
returns public; instead, the law requires only that they maintain
documents adequate to substantiate their claims. The law requires
that foundations and charities go further. Congress has essentially
enlisted the media and the general public as collaborators in ensur-
ing that exempt foundations and charities satisfy the other core
conditions of the compact. It is a unique way to achieve tax policy
objectives but, for the most part, it seems to have some benefits.
The above four core conditions apply to all organizations exempt under
section 501(c)(3). Foundations, however, must also comply with the
more specific regimen that is set out in Code sections 4940 through
4946. Congress originally imposed this regimen in the Tax Reform Act
of 1969. Most of its elements elaborate on the first two core conditions
of the compact—the use of assets exclusively for charitable purposes
and the prohibition on private benefit.13 For example, the first condition
is reinforced by requiring that foundations pay out certain minimum
amounts for charitable purposes each year and that they not make in-
vestments that jeopardize their ability to carry out their charitable pur-
poses. Both of the first two conditions are buttressed by specific rules
against self-dealing, excess business holdings, and taxable expenditures.
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The 1969 act also supplemented the previously exclusive remedy of ter-
minating exempt status for non-compliance by specifying excise taxes
as lesser but still significant consequences for failure to meet the four
core conditions or the act’s more detailed requirements.14
The 1969 legislation, then, was in many ways more procedural than
substantive.15 It enacted more detailed legal standards and new penal-
ties to ensure compliance with the already-existing core conditions ap-
plicable to all section 501(c)(3) entities. The act essentially reinforced
the pre-existing compact, including degrees of openness and disclosure
obligations that were consistent with it. Other than authority to enforce
provisions by imposing excise taxes, the relevant parts of the act did
not vest in government any new affirmative power or authority. 
These core conditions are the basis for legally mandated accounta-
bility, including some that overlap with accountability for satisfying fi-
duciary duties at the state level. These conditions, then, should be the
standard against which to measure the utility of any compelled open-
ness and disclosures. In that sense, they are both a floor and a ceiling.
The floor is that requiring certain disclosures is necessary and appro-
priate to ensure compliance with the tax treatment compact as embod-
ied in the law. The ceiling exists in the sense that these conditions help
protect against intrusiveness, voyeurism, and hijacking of foundation
purposes,16 any of which can fundamentally damage the roles of phi-
lanthropy, particularly as complements and counterweights to the gov-
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14. I.R.C. §§ 4940–4946. 
15. Legislation was concerned with “detecting abuse but not about detecting poor perform-
ance.” Kenneth Prewitt, “American Foundations: What Justifies Their Unique Privileges
and Powers,” in The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations: United States and Euro-
pean Perspectives, ed. Kenneth Prewitt et al. (New York: Russell Sage, 2006), 45.
16. These concerns raise questions about how far government may go in requiring that foun-
dations organized under current law meet quotas for board or staff composition, ratios
for grants to organizations that serve particular causes or efforts, or other such formulas
or imposing other requirements and prohibitions without violating First Amendment free-
doms of speech and association and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process and
possibly even equal protection rights.
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ernment and business sectors. Nothing in the compact or its more spe-
cific application to foundations authorizes government to interject itself
in the management or day-to-day operations of a foundation or charity,
absent evidence of substantial noncompliance, fraud, or abuse. Nor
does government have authority, on this basis, to require greater open-
ness, disclosure, or transparency than is necessary to enforce the tax
treatment compact and its corollaries. Accordingly, arguments to ex-
pand transparency obligations by law beyond accountability to these
conditions are not grounded in the tax treatment compact or its un-
derlying policies, should not be permitted to masquerade as such, and
should survive only if legitimately grounded on independent justifica-
tion. 
B. The Quid Pro Quo Fallacy: 
“What Are We Getting in Return?”
Some critics say we need more transparency than the
law currently requires so that the public can see
whether it is getting enough benefits in return for the
favorable tax treatment accorded to philanthropies and
their donors.
In recent years, people have increasingly asked what society and the
public are getting in return for the tax treatment compact, apparently
focusing on whether foundations and charities make economic contri-
butions to society that equal or exceed the monetary value of their ex-
emptions and deductible contributions.17 This is money, proponents
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similar arguments by Sen. Grassley and Rep. Xavier Becerra (D-Calif.), see Suzanne Perry,
“Paying It Forward—and Back,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, September 4, 2008; Makani
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say, that would otherwise have been available for government to spend
as part of the public treasury. Therefore, they seem to contend that
every section 501(c)(3) entity must show that it affirmatively adds at
least one dollar in value to society or saves government at least one
dollar in value for every dollar exempted or deducted from taxation.
Building on that premise, the argument continues that government
must impose “transparency” so that assessments can be made about
the effectiveness of this proposed value exchange. The natural next step
is to impose consequences if the exchange is deemed unequal.
Setting aside the debate about whether government is taking money
or letting taxpayers keep money, it can be tempting to find appeal in quid
pro quo inquiries, particularly in the face of bad economic times, budget
deficits at all levels of government, and isolated reports of charitable
fraud and abuse. In addition, such inquiries on the surface seem to be
what a responsible person might ask in any area of public policy, partic-
ularly tax policy. After all, public, social, and tax policy should consider
outcomes, costs, and benefits, both economic and non-economic.
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Themba-Nixon, “Can Counting Really Make a Difference?” Philanthropic Initiative for
Racial Equity Critical Issues Forum: Measuring What We Value 1 (2008): 14–15; Arturo
Vargas, “Data Collection Is an Important Tool for Building a More Vibrant Nonprofit
Sector,” in Philanthropic Initiative for Racial Equity Critical Issues Forum: Measuring
What We Value 1 (2008): 16–17; John Gamboa and Pablo Eisenberg, “Mandating Mul-
ticultural Munificence?”; Joel Fleishman, The Foundation: A Great American Secret—
How Private Wealth is Changing the World (New York: PublicAffairs, 2007), 52; and
National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP), Criteria for Philanthropy at
Its Best: Benchmarks to Assess and Enhance Grantmaker Impact (2009). For charitable
deductions “based on the theory that the Government is compensated for the loss of rev-
enue by its relief from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by appro-
priations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from the promotion of the
general welfare,” see Laurens Williams and Donald V. Moorehead, An Analysis of the
Reasons Prompting Current Statutory Distinctions Between Public and Private Charitable
Organizations (Washington: Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs,
1977), 2112; and Peter Frumkin, “Accountability and Legitimacy in American Foundation
Philanthropy,” in The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations, ed. Prewitt et al., 99,
100. To some, accepting tax breaks creates responsibilities. 
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The “quid pro quo” rationale has no basis in law. In fact,
it is contrary to the principles of our nonprofit tax law,
which give private citizens, rather than the public as a
whole, authority to choose the charitable purposes for
which philanthropic dollars should be spent. Moreover,
letting government decide whether philanthropies pro-
vide sufficient benefit means vesting this power where
it is not likely to be exercised well.
Thus, the problem is not necessarily with the inquiry itself but with
certain of its assumptions, inferences, and applications. For instance,
the tax treatment of an exempt organization is generally not determined
by savings to the government or costs government would incur if it
were responsible for delivering the services (or even by the costs in-
curred by the organization itself).18 After all, for over 200 years there
has been recognition that the charitable sector is not a mere proxy for
government, as the quid pro quo theory would posit.19 In addition, if
saving government money were the justifying criterion, exemptions
would be available to individuals and to organizations without regard
to their status as exempt or for-profit.20 Also, many exempt organiza-
tions provide services that are not the responsibility of government in
the first place—indeed, in many instances, they provide services that
government is constitutionally prohibited from providing, which de-
feats any ability to undertake a quid pro quo analysis in these areas.21
Problems continue in that quid pro quo accountability and transparency
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18. See John D. Colombo, “Why Is Harvard Tax-Exempt? (And Other Mysteries of Tax Ex-
emption for Private Educational Institutions),” Arizona Law Review 35 (Winter 1993):
862–64.
19. Chief Justice John Marshall: “Eleemosynary institutions do not fill the place which would
otherwise be occupied by government, that would otherwise remain vacant.” Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 647 (1819). 
20. See Colombo, “Why is Harvard Tax Exempt,” 862–64. 
21. Ibid.
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to support it would impose a new financial condition on the compact and
put government in the position of assessing relative value, merit, and effec-
tiveness of all entities in the sector. Such an imposition either ignores or uni-
laterally changes the existing compact, which could then be used to expand
government intrusions beyond concepts of accountability and transparency. 
Even if it could somehow be argued that the compact can be ignored
or changed, the quid pro quo position is laden with ambiguity, mono-
vision, and suggestions of consequences for failure. Sometimes the devil
really is in the details, particularly with a deceptively simple and other-
wise alluring policy. Like problems with effectiveness generally as an
objective for transparency, which is discussed in section D of chapter II,
the quid pro quo position often neglects the needs to identify and adopt
standards, to empower someone to assess compliance, and to determine
consequences in the event of noncompliance. Taken to an extreme, sec-
tion 501(c)(3) entities could lose their exempt status if they are deemed
deficient in providing adequate monetary value, and organizations
would be denied exempt status if they cannot commit to doing so. Other
suggested or implied consequences for failure might include govern-
ment-imposed quotas or ratios for grantmaking or personnel, fewer de-
cisions (if any) left to the discretion of board or management, or other,
still more expansive and intrusive excursions into autonomy.22
Two additional problems for the quid pro quo approach that de-
serve more attention are the absence of a sound economic basis and its
disregard for the intangible, invaluable contributions of philanthropy. 
The Unclear Economics of the Quid Pro Quo Rationale. The
quid pro quo position lacks clarity or discipline in the value it is de-
manding. For example, while the literal words suggest an intent to as-
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22. Paradoxically, many of the recent proposals that encourage quotas or ratios in activities
and personnel do not seem to concern themselves with the actual effectiveness of the sub-
ject organizations.
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sess the “cost” only in terms of revenue that government forgoes by
allowing exemptions and deductions, the rhetoric and messaging de-
mand more broadly that the “cost” consist of all funds under the man-
agement or control of exempt organizations, even money that was not
“diverted” from the public treasury. Which is it? Consider a donor who
contributes $100 to a charity at a time when the total tax rate on the
donor’s income is 35 percent. A quid pro quo proponent would say
that 35 percent, or $35, is “forgone” by the government: It has gone
to the charity instead of to the public treasury. In contrast, the “all
funds” approach also asserts dominion over the remaining $65 that is
in no sense revenue lost by government. The distinction between these
approaches is neither subtle nor nuanced, and the lack of discipline or
clarity suggests a desire for the broadest application. However, even
accepting the argument at face value, there is no justification in the
compact for government to demand economic value from funds that
would never have been paid in taxes. 
There are at least three more practical reasons why the economics
of the quid pro quo rationale does not work.
First, the quid pro quo argument seems to assume that eliminating
a charitable exemption or deduction will generate at least an equivalent
amount of financial gain to the public treasury. Among the serious
problems with this assumption is that the donor who no longer has the
charitable deduction available may find other tax-deductible uses for
his or her money. Moreover, with regard to foundations, their annual
payouts as required by law likely exceed what the government would
probably receive by taxing their income in any event. Consider a foun-
dation with assets of $100 million that generates net income of $10
million. If the foundation were not exempt, that $10 million would be
taxable: Assuming a rate of 15 percent and no deductions against the
income, the tax due would be $1.5 million. But because the foundation
is exempt, it is required by law to spend five percent of its net asset
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value on distributions that serve its charitable purposes—in other
words, $5 million. That is, the foundation’s qualifying distributions are
more than three times the amount it would pay if it were taxable. In
addition, the “exempt” foundation must pay tax on its net investment
income—generally two percent, or $200,000 in this case—as well as
paying taxes at regular business rates on any unrelated business income.
Applicable tax rates would need to exceed 52 percent—not counting
the expenses that the foundation would incur in generating its income
and could claim as deductions—before government could “break
even.” Therefore, any assumption that changing the tax compact will
automatically grow government coffers is fallacious. 
Second, although the public treasury may gain initially from elimi-
nating the exemption or deduction, it could find itself drained later by
the need to provide services that foundations and charities stopped pro-
viding when contributions fell. Additionally, it cannot be reliably pre-
sumed that government will provide those services at the same or lesser
cost or at the same or better efficiency or quality. If not, government
could ultimately pay more to deliver the services, which might result
in a financial loss to government over time instead of a gain. 
Finally, there is evidence that the economic return from the chari-
table sector may actually exceed, dollar for dollar, the standard re-
quired by a quid pro quo theory, whichever accounting approach its
proponents adopt. Although establishing definitive causal relationships
is not possible, a 2008 study by economists Robert Shapiro and Aparna
Mathur for the Philanthropic Collaborative found that economic ac-
tivity across all subdivisions of the charitable sector yielded an average
eight-to-one return.23 That is, every dollar made available to the sector
through grants and donations appears to generate $8 in economic ben-
efits. That ratio would be substantially higher if applied only to
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Community Foundations (Washington: Philanthropic Collaborative, 2008), 2.
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amounts actually forgone by government—which, as demonstrated
above, represent only a fraction of all philanthropic funds. 
Beyond Economics. Congress regularly uses taxation and other fi-
nancial incentives and preferences for purposes other than generating
revenue to pay for government operations. It commonly uses tax policy
to promote certain behaviors and practices and discourage others. In
the area of philanthropy, tax policy was and is designed to respect and
encourage the critical non-monetary roles and contributions of charities
and foundations. After all, the “underlying motivation of the tax ex-
emptions was not restricted to fiscal advantages to the granting gov-
ernment, nor even restricted to the welfare of its own people” but
instead embraced “ideals of humanitarianism and piety.”24 The philan-
thropic and charitable sectors are replete with examples of value to so-
ciety, often in terms of activities but also through their very existence
as fundamental expressions of principles and values that cannot be ap-
praised. As such, the “tax exemption privilege has much deeper roots
than quid pro quo theory would admit.”25
In other words, it isn’t only, or even necessarily, about the money.
A literal application of the quid pro quo position, in which the “quid”
and the “quo” are commonly understood in financial terms, would
make it about the money and abandon those ideals and all else that
cannot be objectified in monetary terms. 
That danger exists, however, only to the extent that the quid pro
quo analysis is applied consistently. One of the problems with some
quid pro quo positions is the occasional selectivity with which the po-
sition sometimes seems to be advanced. Some applications of the theory
purport to impose the theory generally but forgive it for those charities
and philanthropies that support the causes, issues, purposes, or organ-
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izations they favor. Such inconsistency weakens the value of any prin-
ciples that might otherwise have supported the argument and leaves the
position vulnerable to challenge. Consistently applied, however, the quid
pro quo analysis runs the risk of demeaning essential non-economic con-
tributions that are a hallmark of the sector and epitomize the features
that distinguish philanthropy from government and business.
For instance, there is inherent value in the sector being independent
of government26 and having the flexibility to respond quickly to unex-
pected needs and opportunities. There is value in not being beholden
to politicized policies, pressures, or demands and in not being unduly
influenced by what may be popular or the latest fad.27
There is also value in the sector’s being programmatically separated
from the commercial market. Such a distinction permits foundations
and charities to pursue strategies with a long time horizon and long-
term vision of the future, to sponsor efforts that advance human wel-
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26. “[W]hen you team up with the government, you compromise your ability to be critical of
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to Change Project, 2010).
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fare in the absence of an expected commercial rate of return, and to
fund initiatives that might prove useful to society in ways that are
presently controversial, unacknowledged, or remote.28
Among the many examples are foundations whose funding supported
organizations and activities that eradicated various diseases in parts of
the world; established libraries for the public; founded schools for
African-American children in a time of pervasive segregation and violent
Jim Crow; helped propel the American civil rights movement; revolu-
tionized medical schools; got lane lines on highways and roadways; and
contributed to the development of commercial flight, telecommunica-
tions, and biotechnology. Often, foundations undertook such steps in
the face of severe criticism and threats and despite unpopularity and low
likelihood of success, commercial or otherwise. It is possible that none
of these advances would have occurred without the autonomy, independ-
ence, and privacy that the philanthropic sector enjoyed and continues to
enjoy. They certainly would have occurred differently. 
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There are circumstances in which government can and
should uniformly require more transparency from the
sector. Those circumstances generally involve perva-
sive fraud and abuse not remediable by enforcing cur-
rent law. While there are instances of both, there is not
evidence of a widespread infestation of either, nor is
there evidence that current laws are inadequate to ad-
dress the fraud and abuse that do occur.
Of course, realizing the promise of this independence requires courage,
steadfastness, and discipline. It involves society and donors placing consid-
erable trust in the structure of philanthropy and those who oversee, manage,
and operate its enterprises. Such trust, properly understood, is not blind or
thoughtless but instead is part of a network that seeks to balance regulation,
openness, and accountability with autonomy, independence, and effective-
ness. Thus, some circumstances might warrant more intrusive government
scrutiny or enhanced regulation requiring more openness.
One such circumstance might be an infestation of fraud and abuse that
could not be countered by current laws, regulations, and enforcement. Un-
fortunately, there is a small segment of people who exploit philanthropy
for their own private purposes, just as there are people who do the same
in government and business. Given the frailties of human nature, such in-
dividuals will always exist despite the best efforts of the overwhelming ma-
jority of people in philanthropy who act with good faith and benevolence.
Existing laws must be enforced, and more resources and better coordina-
tion should be devoted to federal and state enforcement efforts. 
Thus, as a matter of imposing accountability under the tax code or
mandating greater transparency in philanthropy, the quid pro quo po-
sition is woefully inadequate and, rather than generating clarity, instead
contributes massively to the confusion.
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C. The Misnomer of Philanthropic 
“Stakeholders”
In addition to being accountable under the law and the tax compact,
some assert that foundations have a duty of accountability to a broad
group of “stakeholders” and that fulfilling this duty justifies demands
for greater transparency. Like quid pro quo thinking, an expansive view
of who constitutes a legitimate stakeholder might have an intuitive ap-
peal on the surface, but the most commonly asserted arguments for
more expansive accountability and corresponding transparency man-
dates quickly fall apart when challenged. 
For instance, as with other aspects of the charitable sector, discussions
about foundation stakeholders often suffer from lack of clarity in word
choice, definition, and discipline. For example, the term can be applied
without distinguishing between legally vested rights and responsibilities
and various social interests. Stakeholder theory is essentially a theory of
management.29 Some advocates, however, seek to vest such management
theories and practices with fiduciary levels of responsibility and gover-
nance. The resulting confusion, if left unchecked, could threaten the abil-
ity of foundations to fulfill their roles and responsibilities in our system. 
This is not to suggest that foundations do not have legitimate stake-
holders or that foundations should not be appropriately accountable
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and transparent, legally and socially, to those stakeholders. Nor should
they ignore or neglect the very people and institutions that are affected
by their decisions. But there are critical differences between legal and
social accountability and the degree of transparency applicable to each.
The former is grounded in law and all the hallmarks of law in civil so-
ciety in terms of resorting to courts, imposing consequences for viola-
tions, and raising expectations of order, consistency, and predictability.
The latter is derived from the possible impact that decisions by founda-
tion personnel might have on others. Discussions about philanthropic
transparency and accountability would benefit from understanding and
maintaining this distinction.
Rights Holders and Guardians. Within the first category of stake-
holders are those who have legally enforceable rights and the ability to
demand corresponding remedies and consequences for a foundation or
person’s failure to respect those rights. These rights may be grounded in
statutes, regulations, contracts, or fiduciary duties. In some instances, such
rights may be broadly applied to the entirety of the foundation as an en-
terprise, including governance, management, and programs. In other in-
stances those rights may be narrowly confined to a particular obligation
undertaken as a matter of contract. In both cases, a foundation has a duty
of accountability and relative degrees of transparency to such stakehold-
ers. Indeed, the persons described by this category are perhaps more ap-
propriately deemed “rights holders” rather than being lumped
indiscriminately into the more generic category of “stakeholders.”
Examples of such rights holders include members of the boards of
directors or trustees, members of management, and other significant
decision makers. As is discussed in part A, directors, trustees, and man-
agement have responsibilities for ensuring charitable organization and
operation, protecting against impermissible private benefit, ensuring
that there is not improper lobbying and political intervention, and ef-
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fecting required disclosures and reporting. They are rights holders be-
cause they have legal authority, can legally be held to account person-
ally and collectively, and can legally hold others to account. As long as
they serve in these positions, they have no subsequent right to abrogate
or neglect their duties and responsibilities with impunity. Additionally,
they also have at least a moral and, in some cases, legal responsibility
to the donor and his or her instructions and intentions.
The chief charity official of a state, usually the Attorney General or
Secretary of State, and the Internal Revenue Service are often portrayed
as rights holders. Certainly, foundations have legal responsibilities to
account to charity officials and the IRS, particularly with regard to mat-
ters such as compliance with donor intent, charitable organization and
operation, and the absence of impermissible private benefit. Moreover,
charity officials and the IRS have the legal power and duty to hold foun-
dations and their personnel accountable for failing to fulfill those and
other responsibilities. However, neither charity officials nor the IRS have
the legal authority or legitimate right to substitute their personal opin-
ions, preferences, or judgment for that of the donor or of foundation
personnel, if such judgment is exercised reasonably and in good faith
and otherwise satisfies donor intent and complies with the law.
Consequently, it may be more accurate to characterize charity offi-
cials and the IRS as “rights guardians” rather than direct rights holders.
In essence, these guardians protect donor intent and ensure compliance
with the law. In both instances, charity officials and the IRS also protect
society’s interest in preserving and promoting private foundations and
the roles they fulfill in our systems. Foundations are appropriately ac-
countable to rights guardians and have transparency obligations that
further such accountability. 
Interest Holders. The second category of alleged foundation “stake-
holders” includes those who are affected by decisions of foundations
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and their personnel and, as such, have interests in those decisions. In
contrast with holders of legal rights and responsibilities, persons in this
second category might better be called “interest holders.” Despite their
interests in particular results, they do not have an intrinsic legal claim
to particular outcomes, nor can they be held to account for the manner
in which they exercise or pursue their interests. They also lack an in-
herent ability to pursue or impose legal consequences for decisions with
which they disagree, even if such decisions cause them harm. Instead,
their influence is social rather than legal.
In the case of private foundations, interest holders might include
grant recipients, unsuccessful applicants, and potential recipients of
grants; the people, causes, and missions served by grant recipients, un-
successful applicants, and potential applicants; employees of the foun-
dation, grant recipients, unsuccessful applicants, and potential
applicants; others who work in and fund the same charitable missions,
including other foundations, individuals, corporate funders, charities,
and governments; vendors, suppliers, and creditors; researchers, aca-
demics, and theoreticians; various communities; and many others.
Given the longevity of most foundations, another set of interest holders
might even be future generations of the above who are affected by cur-
rent decisions. The degree and weight of these interests among these
holders are likely to change over time and circumstances. 
It would be impossible to prioritize each of these interests equally
or even to a rational degree of proportion. Choices must be made. At
a minimum, limited resources prevent funding every grant request and
require making hard choices from among equally deserving applicants.
Moreover, these interests often will irreconcilably conflict with each
other, so that there is no way a material decision can fully (or in many
cases even partially) satisfy all of the possible interests. Stated differ-
ently, someone will almost always be disappointed or worse. For in-
stance, current grantees might contend that they have an abiding
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interest in continuing or even increasing their grants; this interest nec-
essarily clashes with the interests of other current grantees and of un-
successful applicants and potential grantees who would like to change
the status quo to favor their own interests. Legally prioritizing the in-
terests of current grantees would likely inhibit innovation and change,
while forcing foundations to prefer other claimants to foundation funds
would interfere with the benefits of consistency, success, and a long
time horizon. 
That is part of the reason why rights holders exist in America—to
evaluate competing claims and make decisions using their best judg-
ment so as to implement donor intent, ensure compliance with the law,
and achieve desirable charitable outcomes. To help foundation person-
nel make the decisions they must make in an informed manner, it often
would be appropriate, and even encouraged as a management practice,
for them to engage with—that is, listen to and provide relevant infor-
mation to—some of those who have affected interests. Thus, manage-
ment considerations, rather than legal obligations, provide the proper
framework within which to consider the ways in which “stakeholder”
theory might translate from the for-profit sector to foundations, despite
the clearly divergent contexts. 
For instance, for-profit companies need buyers to whom to sell their
goods and services; they want suppliers, creditors and others to give them
better terms; they want to attract and retain employees and potential em-
ployees; and they often want to be appreciated within their communities.
The ways in which these non-shareholder stakeholders perceive busi-
nesses can fundamentally affect the businesses’ ultimate legal objectives—
that is, their profitability. Therefore, as a theory of for-profit
management, choosing to engage non-shareholder stakeholders can be
meaningful, because failing to do so can have direct consequences on the
company’s bottom line and ultimate legal objectives. The relationship is
reciprocal: All of these non-shareholder stakeholders have a direct inter-
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est in the companies’ profitability, because the lack of profitability can
directly threaten the ability to pursue their respective interests. The rec-
iprocity generates some material degree of substantive alignment. 
Herein lies one of the key differences between a for-profit com-
pany’s non-shareholder stakeholders and a foundation’s interest hold-
ers. A foundation’s ultimate legal objective (and the responsibility of
its rights holders and guardians) is to pursue charitable purposes con-
sistent with donor intent and the law. It cannot be presumed that in-
terest holders share that same objective for the foundation, nor is there
a degree of alignment comparable to the alignment of goals among the
array of for profit stakeholders. In fact, some interest holders may have
objectives that undermine a foundation’s charitable status. Thus, vest-
ing accountability and transparency rights in foundation interest hold-
ers as if they were stakeholders of for-profit companies would be
fallacious. They are not the same. 
Not only are they not the same, but under our American system,
non-shareholder stakeholders of for-profit companies lack legal status
that would permit them to file claims, pursue remedies, or assert legal
consequences for failure to respect their position as stakeholders. Con-
stituency statutes enacted in most states during and since the 1980s
never changed that dynamic; instead, such statutes merely protect di-
rectors from liability for considering certain non-shareholder interests
in certain unique situations.30 Even the more recently created flexible-
purpose corporations and benefit corporations do not vest standing or
authority in non-shareholder stakeholders to hold directors or man-
agement accountable if they neglect such stakeholders.31 As a result,
stakeholder theory and practice in the for-profit context in the United
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30. See John Tyler, “Negating the Legal Problem of Having ‘Two Masters’: A Framework for L3C
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability,” Vermont Law Review 35 (Fall 2010): 117, 131–38.
31. Ibid., 136 n.88; and John Tyler, “Regulating Charitable Hybrid Forms and the Effect of Various
Approaches on Financial Capital,” NYU Journal of Law and Business (forthcoming, Spring 2013). 
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States remain, at best, a focus of management or business ethics, not
of governance and fiduciary duties.
Therefore, to the extent that there is reliance on appeals to “stake-
holder” theories and practices to justify holding foundations account-
able to interest holders and to demand greater transparency as a result,
such reliance is misplaced for at least two independent reasons. First,
such appeals misapply management and business ethics theories and
practices to matters of governance and fiduciary duty. The principles
that characterize these spheres are not the same, and confusion and
harm result from conflating them. Second, these appeals actually seek
to vest more rights in interest holders than is enjoyed by non-legal
stakeholders of for-profit companies. 
Although foundations may have the legal right to ignore or neglect
interest holders, there are numerous reasons why doing so would be
generally counterproductive and maybe even unwise. Many of these rea-
sons are presented in chapter III, which discusses why voluntarily and
strategically undertaking degrees of transparency beyond the minimums
required by law can serve foundations generally and any given founda-
tion more specifically. Among the benefits are enhanced reputation and
credibility, stronger and more informed programs and grantmaking, po-
tentially more efficient processes, and greater opportunities for collab-
oration, scaling and replicating successes, and avoiding mistakes.
Particularly in this age of social media and instant communication
of unfiltered opinions, interest holders do have a voice that can exert
social pressure on foundations and their personnel, and they can have
a very meaningful influence. This can be a negative factor for a founda-
tion or can be very beneficial, depending on the way in which founda-
tions engage before and during such situations. More than just paying
attention to rights holders and guardians, foundations also should con-
sider how best to engage their relevant interest holders affirmatively, as
a management tool, in order to pursue their charitable purposes most
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effectively and efficiently consistent with donor intent and the law. Such
an effort, however, should not be confused with or deviate towards legal
accountability and misapplied stakeholder theories and practices.
D. Accountability to Donor Intent
Philanthropies have a degree of accountability to their
donors under state law. But this accountability varies
widely by state, and trying to expand state law ac-
countability is likely to harm philanthropy at least as
much as it helps.
Donors who create or contribute to philanthropic organizations
rightly have implicit if not legally enforceable expectations that their
charitable intent will be honored—including, in some cases, an intent
to defer to the decisions of others. Such philanthropists make their in-
tent known through combinations of various informal methods and
formal documentation, such as trust agreements, articles of incorpora-
tion, bylaws, and applications that ask the IRS to recognize their or-
ganizations as exempt.32 Philanthropists, then, should be able to
reasonably expect that the trustees, directors, and managers of the char-
itable enterprises they create or support will abide by their stated in-
tentions—not the retrospective interpretations of that intent but, as
much as possible, the actual, objective intent of the donor. 
Living donors may or may not have authority to enforce that intent
directly in the courts. Much depends on the specifics of state laws and
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the content of the donative documents, including the clarity with which
intent is stated and the degree of discretion granted to trustees, direc-
tors, and managers. The donor’s heirs are even more limited in their
ability to enforce donor intent directly, though the donative documents
and less formal statements of intent can be helpful if the heirs serve as
directors or employees or wish to appeal to a state Attorney General. 
Ultimately, society has an abiding interest in respecting and protect-
ing essential degrees of donor intent, if for no other reason than to en-
courage the continuing formation of and donations to philanthropic
enterprises. If potential philanthropists cannot securely expect their le-
gitimate charitable intent will be honored and enforced, they will not
create such entities or contribute to them. Philanthropists gain their
confidence based in part on how Attorneys General and public treat
the donors who have preceded them. If that record is not meaningfully
reliable, they will deploy their wealth in other ways that may or may
not serve society as broadly or productively.33
Responsibility for fulfilling this obligation to society and the phi-
lanthropist, particularly one who is deceased, is normally vested by
statute or common law in the state Attorney General or other chief
charity official. As discussed earlier, that investiture does not permit
these persons to substitute their judgment or charitable—or political—
intent for that of the donor, nor is it their prerogative to pursue their
versions of donor intent. State charity officials best fulfill their duty by
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33. Potential donors also gain comfort from the record with regard to how well or poorly
subsequent trustees, directors, and managers abide by or neglect donor intent. For dis-
cussions of how donor intent has been perceived with regard to particular aspects of the
Ford Foundation, the Pew Trusts, the Barnes Collection, the Marin County Community
Foundation, and others, see Waldemar Nielsen, The Golden Donors: A New Anatomy of
the Great Foundations (New York: E. P. Dutton, 1989); and Martin Morse Wooster, The
Great Philanthropists and the Problem of “Donor Intent,” 3rd ed. (Washington: Capital
Research Center, 2007). With regard to the Robertson donation to Princeton University,
see Neal Freeman et al., The Robertson v. Princeton Case: Too Important to Be Left to
the Lawyers (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2009).
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seeking, as much as possible, to enforce the donor’s intent to the extent
that it can be discerned. The courts also can have an important role,
for matters brought before them, in overseeing how charity officials
carry out their duties and countering efforts to distort donor intent or
exceed boundaries of authority. 
Just as Congress has enlisted the public and the media to facilitate
accountability to the tax treatment compact, donors can rely on various
disclosures to encourage fidelity to their intent. At a minimum, articles
of incorporation, exemption applications, recognition letters from the
IRS, and annual tax information returns are required by law to be
made available to the public, including the media. Members of the pub-
lic and the media can examine and compare these documents and from
them gain some degree of understanding of donor intent and possible
deviations from that intent, which they can then publicize or provide
to a state’s chief charity official. To the extent a donor wants to expand
the role of the public and the media in this regard and further deploy
social accountability, she or he can make other documents and infor-
mation more broadly available to them. 
However, providing for such expansive transparency ultimately can
be of limited usefulness and can actually be detrimental. The usefulness
is limited because the public and the media have no enforcement au-
thority. At best, they exercise persuasive authority by putting pressure
on trustees, directors, and managers or the Attorney General. More-
over, the public and the media are likely to have only bits and pieces of
relevant information; they are not likely to have most, much less all,
of it. Thus, their conclusions can be faulty. If so, their subsequent ac-
tions can disrupt the enterprise’s valid pursuit of mission and divert
funds and other resources from legitimate programs and operations.
Such actions also can distract trustees, directors, and managers from
fulfilling their primary obligations to the donor, the law, and society. 
Of course, a donor could choose to communicate her or his intent
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publicly while living. For instance, Andrew Carnegie was very public
about his philanthropic intentions, activities, and philosophy. He also
was clear about vesting ultimate decision-making authority in his foun-
dation’s trustees, including authority to deviate from his precedents and
words in order to pursue those charitable objectives they believed best
under the circumstances. Melinda and Bill Gates have chosen to be sim-
ilarly open about their philanthropic goals and how they intend to pur-
sue them through their foundation. In addition to some of the benefits
of openness discussed in chapter III, part A, such openness invites the
public and the media into an informal—but still limited—relationship
with a foundation’s trustees, directors, and managers after a donor can
no longer be active. The possible dangers of such an invitation can be
mitigated if, in addition, a donor either communicates, with similar
publicity, an intent to empower trustees to use their discretion as An-
drew Carnegie did or is explicit and public about her or his program-
matic and operational intent. 
Donors who are very public about these aspects of their philan-
thropy also set expectations concerning the way they expect their foun-
dation to operate subsequently. With a donor for whom anonymity or
privacy is a priority, or who chooses to be more open about certain
things than others, such expectations can sometimes be inferred from
the donor’s patterns of action. Care should be taken, however, to dis-
tinguish between a donor experimenting with possible fads and pro-
viding informed, thoughtful guidance. Care should also be exercised
to avoid unintentionally vesting in the public or media or some vague
subset of either a pretense of authority or influence that does not exist
in law and can be detrimental in practice to clear decision-making and
achieving charitable goals. 
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Chapter II 
Philanthropic 
Transparency In 
Context: Fallacies of the
Four Most Common 
Arguments
The disclosure currently required of foundations—their legally man-
dated degree of transparency—serves substantive public policy objec-
tives of accountability that are clearly linked to tax policy and limited
accountability to donors. Today, however, many would require consid-
erably more from foundations. These arguments for further trans-
parency generally fall into four major categories: 
1. Transparency as an end in itself
2. Transparency to ensure that foundations serve “public” purposes
3. Transparency to re-balance a purported power asymmetry between
foundations and grantees
4. Transparency to enable assessments of foundation effectiveness
Although these positions could have merit in certain contexts and ap-
plications, including some storefront appeal, further analysis shows
that they are inherently unsound as stand-alone objectives. As such,
these objectives as generally alleged contribute to the quagmire instead
of to the desired clarity and coherence, particularly if trying to justify
legally expanding intrusions. 
1. For the need to “demand clear, detailed information about the results of efforts and hold charities to
the same standard of transparency and accountability that we ask of government and public corpo-
rations see, e.g., Sally Beatty, “How Charities Can Make Themselves More Open,” Wall Street Jour-
nal, December 10, 2007. John Gamboa justified California legislation on foundation transparency
by explaining that it requires reporting “like you see in government and private industry.” Bradley
Center, Mandating Multicultural Munificence? (transcript, Washington: Hudson Institute, 2008).
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A. Transparency for Its Own Sake 
Those who make this argument treat transparency as an
independent value like democracy, liberty, justice, or moral
virtue. They claim that philanthropies should be transpar-
ent in the same way that government and business are.
But liberal democracies do not treat transparency as an
end in itself: We impose different degrees of transparency
on different institutions, based on the purposes they serve
in our larger political, economic, and social systems.
We require the most transparency from govern-
ment; we require the least transparency from individual
citizens, who even exercise their most sacred public re-
sponsibility—voting—in secret. In between, we require
extensive transparency from public corporations be-
cause of their obligations to their shareholders and
their role in the public markets; we require less trans-
parency when businesses are private.
Philanthropy is neither government nor a series of
public corporations. As with each, the degree of trans-
parency imposed on philanthropy should be based on
an analysis of what is needed to ensure that it fulfills its
role in our system without imposing unacceptable costs
in terms of expense, opportunity, or principle.
Proponents commonly point to the transparency of government and
business to justify mandating greater openness in philanthropy.1 These
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appeals usually treat transparency with simplicity and as if it were an
end unto itself—as if the mandated openness of and disclosures by gov-
ernment and business were not imposed to further other objectives.
The assertions also seem to imply that government, business, and phi-
lanthropy are equivalent, or at least that transparency being required
in one sector is reason to export it to other sectors without regard to
their differences and respective roles and responsibilities. The reality is
otherwise. 
Enterprises in each of the three sectors have unique objectives that
support different types and degrees of transparency. Efforts to shoehorn
any one sector into either of the others miss the all-important point
that transparency is not an end unto itself. Transparency is not an in-
dependent good like democracy, freedom, liberty, justice, or moral
virtue. Achieving transparency does not satisfy some inherent goal, des-
tiny, or purpose. Instead, transparency is a tool—a vehicle or strategy
for pursuing other, higher objectives, values, and principles.
For example, transparency in the government of a representative
democracy is intended to allow those who govern to be held account-
able to those who have granted them authority to govern—that is, to
the people. Transparency of publicly traded companies, as distinct from
business more broadly, is generally intended to serve at least two pur-
poses: accountability to shareholder-owners and improved distribution
of information to support credible financial markets. In neither case is
transparency an end in itself, nor is it related to exemptions, deduc-
tions, credits, or other tax benefits. 
These points are further emphasized by the additional differences
between what the law expects with regard to openness of publicly
traded versus privately owned companies. These differences do not de-
pend on factors such as number of employees, sales volume, industry
position, etc., and they certainly have nothing to do with beneficial tax
treatment. Instead, the different requirements for transparency reflect
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the different relationships that the two types of firms have to the finan-
cial markets and the different ways in which information about the un-
derlying companies affects the broader economy. Because the objectives
of transparency are different in each case, the expectations are different.
We expect more openness from publicly traded companies because the
effects of less openness are more significant.
Likewise, the objectives and roles of philanthropy differ from those
of other sectors. Philanthropic objectives differ from those of govern-
ment if for no other reason than that philanthropy does not and should
not exercise powers of taxation, enact legislation or impose regulations
that govern citizen behavior, adjudicate violations of law, exercise em-
inent domain, or exhibit other indicia of sovereign authority. Nor does
philanthropy have the responsibilities of government or function as a
proxy for government.2 Though some philanthropic enterprises choose
to fund activities that would otherwise fall to government, among the
defining characteristics of philanthropy is its ability and responsibility
to do certain things and take certain risks that government cannot and
should not.
Neither does philanthropy compare closely in this regard with pub-
lic companies. Among the many differences are their respective orien-
tations toward profit versus charitable purpose, time horizons for
results, and capacity to take various risks. There also are material dif-
ferences with regard to the effects of failure, fraud, and corruption.
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2. Chief Justice Marshall distinguished sharply between the role of charities and that of gov-
ernment, saying that “eleemosynary institutions do not fill the place which would other-
wise be occupied by government, that which would otherwise remain vacant.” Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. at 647.  Williams and Moorehead state that foundations
operate in “areas into which government cannot and should not advance.” Laurens
Williams and Donald V. Moorehead, An Analysis of the Reasons Prompting Current
Statutory Distinctions Between Public and Private Charitable Organizations (Washington:
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, 1977); and Chauncey Belknap,
“The Federal Income Tax Exemption of Charitable Organizations: Its History and Un-
derlying Policy,” Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs: Research Papers
4 (Washington: U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1977): 2016 and 2039. 
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Such behavior in public companies can influence the almost-immediate
movement of trillions of dollars and jeopardize the ability of millions
of people to earn livelihoods, pay for educations, and enjoy retire-
ments.
This is not to suggest that failure, fraud, and corruption in philan-
thropy are without meaningful impact. It is just that the effects are
different, should be understood as distinct, and should not be equated
with those of other sectors. Philanthropies are more like private com-
panies than they are like government, but they are generally distinct
from private companies in their exclusive dedication to charitable, ex-
empt purposes and in the wide gulf created by the absence of a profit
motive.
Thus, the value and utility of transparency depend on the presence
of independent and legitimate objectives to justify its existence, scope,
and extent, and both the purposes for transparency and methods for
achieving it are particular to the situation’s objectives. For both gov-
ernment and publicly traded companies, transparency is imposed in de-
grees, rather than in absolutes. Even when holding governors
accountable to the governed, we rarely expect “full” or “complete”
transparency. Not everyone has access to everything: certain meetings
are closed; certain documents are protected; there are gradations. Even
that most elemental action at the heart of a representative democracy—
citizen voting—is not transparent. Limits exist. Likewise, publicly
traded companies are not expected to be fully or completely transpar-
ent. Board and management meetings continue to be held in private,
and considerations of such things as competitive advantage, sustain-
ability, and profitability justify respecting boundaries and limits on
legally coerced transparency. 
Unfortunately, some conversations about transparency in philan-
thropy have tended towards hyperbole in seeming to embrace or com-
mand “full,” “absolute,” or “complete” transparency and in speaking
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of transparency as an end in itself.3 At one time, it may have been rea-
sonable to understand this language as merely appealing to higher (or
the highest) ethical standards and not applying literally. After all, the
thinking went, everyone “knows” what such adjectives as modifiers re-
ally mean and that objecting to their use is overly sensitive.4 Regret-
tably, there has been a growing trend toward treating transparency as
if synonymous with truthfulness and integrity, such that foundations
not perceived as fully, absolutely, or completely transparent can be un-
fairly and inaccurately portrayed or considered suspect, deceitful, or
even corrupt. When that happens, transparency increasingly threatens
to become, whether genuinely or disingenuously, an independent meas-
ure of philanthropic virtue. 
It does not seem unfair to wonder why that has happened and
whether it is appropriate to allow it to continue. Some may be striving
for a utopian vision or idyllic state of affairs. Others may not have fully
thought through the implications. Some may simply want to better un-
derstand the sector more broadly, and there can be merit in transparency
that furthers data collection and analysis in order to facilitate a deeper,
more comprehensive understanding of the sector’s presence in society.
More ominously, however, others may be arguing for transparency as a
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3. “The larger [a foundation] is, the more energetically it should disseminate full information on
its activities.” Vartan Gregorian, Transparency and Accomplishment: A Legacy of Glass Pockets
(New York: Carnegie Corporation, 2003), 1. Andrew Carnegie also called for “full publicity,”
“openness, honesty and transparency” in “all aspects of our work and finances” and “absolute
transparency in communicating progress toward our goals.” Ibid., 6–7 (emphases added). Pro-
fessionalization and bureaucratization make foundations “profoundly public institutions” that
should be “open and accountable to all.” Peter Frumkin, Trouble in Foundationland: Looking
Back, Looking Ahead (Washington: Hudson Institute, 2004), 32. Stone recommends “full dis-
closure of foundation operations.” Lawrence M. Stone, “Charitable Foundation: Its Gover-
nance,” Law and Contemporary Problems 39. no. 1 (1975) 63 (emphasis added).
4. Evelyn Brody and John Tyler, How Public Is Private Philanthropy?: Separating Reality
from Myth, 2nd ed. (Washington: The Philanthropy Roundtable, 2012), 17; Evelyn Brody
and John Tyler, “Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public is Private
Philanthropy? Chicago-Kent Law Review 85, no. 2 (June 2010), 573. Similar arguments
are made in the debate over “public money,” a term that continues to be applied literally
but without a concern for the precise legal and historical nuances of the term.
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vehicle for redistribution, litigation, or something else entirely. In other
words, motives can matter, particularly if clandestine or surreptitious. 
In evaluating motives, the nature of the philanthropic enterprise
should be kept in mind. More specifically, turning down requests for
funds is not just an inescapable part of philanthropy but a core function
of operating, managing, and overseeing a foundation. It is not uncom-
mon for a foundation to reject substantially more requests than it funds.
This is one feature that distinguishes grantmakers from government,
business, and other 501(c)(3) organizations, none of which has the affir-
mative job of rejecting people as such a regular, omnipresent experience.
Nearly every rejection strikes at a program, need, or cause in which the
applicant has vested personal passion and fervor. Thus, an inherent part
of foundation activities is upsetting people or making them angry. 
Similarly, for just about any programmatic or strategic decision a
foundation makes, there are likely to be some who oppose or are even
actively hostile to the underlying activity, cause, purpose, or organiza-
tion. This, too, can be upsetting or even maddening. 
None of this is intended to evoke the playing of violins but merely
serves as a reminder of this reality of foundation operations—a reality
derived precisely from being a plurality of independent, private, au-
tonomous entities. These characteristics are essential to philanthropy’s
ability to serve our various systems and they are too important to risk
losing. Society and philanthropy act at their peril, and to the detriment
of philanthropy’s ability to fulfill its roles and responsibilities, if they
presume—and allow others to presume—that transparency is an end
in itself; that philanthropy is too much like government and not enough
like privately held companies; that purpose, context, scope, and degree
are not relevant; or that some who would impose expansive trans-
parency are not harboring other intentions. 
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B. Transparency for the Sake of Public
Benefit and Social Good
Those who make this argument note that foundations
are not purely private organizations: They seek to pro-
mote a vision of public good. Because it involves a “pub-
lic” good, the argument goes, the public must have a role
in determining this vision. But, in fact, there is no single
definition of “public good”; and, if there were such a def-
inition, no private foundation could possibly meet it. In-
stead, what foundations provide, and what the tax code
makes possible, is a pluralistic array of private visions
that together contribute to making up the public good.
Some argue that government must impose greater transparency on phi-
lanthropy, foundations in particular, because law and principle require
that they serve the “public good” and provide “social benefit.”5 More
specifically, they continue, philanthropy “by its nature intrudes into the
public sphere,” or “is public in its intention,” or “seeks to enact a private
vision of the common good,” or “projects private values and commit-
ments into the public sphere.”6 More aggressive positions characterize
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5. See Gregorian, Transparency and Accomplishment, 1, 4; Frumkin writes that philanthropy has
moved from satisfying donors to producing “public and community benefits.” Additionally, foun-
dations have recast themselves as “public trusts to be governed by public purposes . . . open and ac-
countable to all,” Frumkin, Trouble in Foundationland, 15, 33, 35, 40, 53. See also Evelyn Brody,
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voluntary disclosures. “[A]pplication of [foundation] resources to public purposes should make
foundations accountable to the public.” Terry Odendahl, Over Two Decades of Philanthropic Re-
form, (Washington: Center for Public and Nonprofit Leadership, Georgetown University, 2003), 3.
6. See Peter Frumkin, “Accountability and Legitimacy,” in The Legitimacy of Philanthropic Foundations,
ed. Kenneth Prewitt et al. (New York: Russell Sage, 2006), 100. Williams and Moorehead write that
the “concept of tax exemption as a public trust . . . carries with it the obligation of affirmative public
accountability.” Williams and Moorehead, An Analysis of the Federal Tax Distinctions, 2127.
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“donors, taxpayers, and nonprofits” as “partners in pursuit of the com-
mon good,” such that all of them have “certain rights and responsibilities
in this partnership.”7 As “partners,” the argument goes, “we need to
share power” by ensuring that donors “democratize their work,” pre-
sumably including their decision-making.8
Certain of these arguments may have theoretical attractiveness in a vac-
uum. But as a matter of practical policy, they do not justify expanding the
tax code compact by imposing new standards of accountability or open-
ness, nor do they provide the requisite clarity for adopting “public benefit”
or “social good” as unassailable objectives for philanthropic transparency. 
One general problem with these arguments is that they neglect the
irreducibly private character of many of philanthropy’s core decisions.
Among these are decisions to donate private funds in the first place and
how much to donate, the selection of the particular charitable purposes
to which the funds will be dedicated, the choice of the organizational
form through which to implement these choices, and sometimes even the
selection of directors and managers with fiduciary responsibility for the
funds and their deployment.9 Decisions of this sort are fundamental ex-
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7. See Aaron Dorfman, “The Giving Pledge: Dangerous Implications for Democratic Deci-
sion-Making,” Huffington Post, December 21, 2010. 
8. Ibid.
9. “Each philanthropic gift, or new foundation established, was highly motivated by the donor’s
free right to individually select their own charitable interest, as well as set the time and condi-
tions of the gift. The fundamental right of every citizen to engage in his or her own individual
philanthropic selection and action is the foundation of the giving spirit of our voluntary system.
As a free people we want the right to live our lives with as much freedom and individual choice
as possible, including the making and selection of philanthropic and charitable choices. [More-
over,] the opportunity to individually choose is central to the donor’s voluntary decision to
give.” Curtis W. Meadows Jr., Philanthropic Choice and Donor Intent: Freedom, Responsi-
bility and Public Interest, (Washington: Center for Public and Nonprofit Leadership, George-
town University, 2002), 2. Belknap writes that the “essential brilliance of tax exemption is
that it is automatic in that government does not control the flow of funds . . . ; the receipts of
each organization are determined by the values and choices of private givers [and] the benefi-
ciary organizations receive their governmental aid without having to petition for it”; Belknap,
“Federal Income Tax Exemption,” 2039. “[E]ffective philanthropy is fundamentally personal.
Philanthropists accomplish far more when they pursue results driven explicitly by who they
are and what they care about most.” Thomas J. Tierney, “To Succeed, Philanthropy Needs to
Be Rooted in Deep Personal Beliefs,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, February 20, 2011.” 
56
pressions of distinctively American values: freedom of speech, associa-
tion, and even religion.10 They also arguably and uniquely manifest both
the “pursuit of happiness” and the “blessings of liberty” embraced in
the Declaration of Independence and the preamble to the Constitution.
In addition, the state laws under which foundations operate recog-
nize that donors, founders, trustees, and subsequent directors and man-
agers—not government or the public—have authority and
responsibility in this sphere, subject to their compliance with the law.
Merrimon Cuninggim, a former president of the Danforth Foundation,
gave voice to the “immensely important distinction” between the char-
itable purposes that foundations serve and the private nature of foun-
dation decision-making, which is beyond the “hands of the general
public or Government.”11
There is no legal requirement that any foundation serve the “pub-
lic,” at least as that term is broadly defined to encompass all members
of the population.12 Indeed, it is hard to see how there could be such a
requirement. No foundation has the resources to meaningfully serve
all members of the public. A still more basic problem is that there is no
consensus about what “public benefit” and “social good” mean for
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11. Cuninggim recognized at the same time that such private decisions must direct philanthropic
assets to exempt purposes associated with “the general welfare or some chosen segment of
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philanthropy, beyond what is provided in the tax code. On one hand,
a narrowly based consensus about these terms is likely to give rise to
ill-conceived susceptibility to the most popular ideas, fads, fashions,
and the short term.13 On the other hand, these terms could be defined
so broadly as to render philanthropy indistinguishable from govern-
ment and the “public” it is responsible for serving. 
These definitional problems developed over time—in much the
same way that definitional problems with the modifiers of “trans-
parency” shifted over time, from expressive to increasingly literal and
absolute. Recently, however, the terms have been used in ways that
overstate those served by philanthropy and mistakenly equate the
“public” served by philanthropy with the “public” to which govern-
ment is responsible. But the degrees of transparency required of gov-
ernment reflect its specific duties to the public, which are different
duties and different “publics” from philanthropy’s. The distinctive fea-
tures of government and philanthropy are the source of many of phil-
anthropy’s most meaningful contributions to the nation,14 including an
unencumbered ability to criticize government and its policies and
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rary Problems 39, no. 1 (Winter 1975): 255, 259 . See generally Christopher Levenick et
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strategies.15 Equating philanthropy with government and migrating
governmental standards of openness to philanthropy risk undermining
characteristics that contribute to philanthropy’s unique value. 
Conversely, with regard to business, rather than actively conflating the
various “publics,” critics many times ignore the “public” and “social”
purposes served by for-profit enterprises even as they preserve the primacy
of profit. For instance, it has been argued that foundations and their
donors must be more transparent because “philanthropy has as its inten-
tions and seeks to enact a private vision of the common good.” In this
view, such a goal “raises accountability issues precisely because the act of
giving projects private values and commitments into the public sphere.”16
This contention contrasts the public-directed intentions of philanthropy
with the sale and use of goods or services in the market, which “rarely has
as its goal generating direct consequences for others.”17 The argument is
that public policy can justify more intrusive philanthropic transparency
than what is expected of business because philanthropy is intended to serve
the public good, provide social benefit, and be of direct consequence for
others, while business is not meant to do these things. There are at least
three reasons why this contrast is not as simple or useful as it may seem.
First, non-business sectors of society—that is, government and phi-
lanthropy—depend on the revenue and profitability of the business sec-
tor. Government, whose whole purpose is to further the public good,
cannot operate without the tax revenues derived from taxpayers with
taxable income. Similarly, the philanthropic sector—whose focus is on
charitable, exempt purposes as a subset of public purposes—depends on
contributions that are not possible without successful business enterprises
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to generate wealth and employ the people who contribute to charities.
Thus, as the primary source of funding for government and philanthropy,
business in many ways serves their respective public purposes. 
Second, many for-profit businesses have among their founding inten-
tions the aim of directly affecting the lives of others. Even businesses with-
out such intentions often can’t help doing so. Think of Microsoft, Apple,
Disney, General Motors, Ford, Merck, AOL, Time Warner, Google,
Yahoo, IBM, General Electric, Kellogg, and many, many more. Even small,
local businesses implement a private vision of their inventors, entrepre-
neurs, founders, directors, and managers seeking to be of “direct conse-
quence for others.” Not only that, but many businesses are born or grow
precisely because of a private intention—a vision—not only to affect lives
and advance human welfare but to change the trajectory of industries or
give rise to whole new industries of direct consequence to others. Think
of aeronautics, biomedicine, pharmacology, nanotechnology, computer
hardware and software, the internet, search engines, communications, mo-
bile devices, energy, automobiles, entertainment, and many, many more.
These advances and their benefits arose because the business sector re-
searches, develops, and distributes innovative products, services, systems,
and processes that stimulate economic growth and advance human wel-
fare. More than merely being of direct consequence, these undertakings
frequently end up serving the public good and providing social benefits.
Third, among the outcomes of most businesses in the American
marketplace is providing jobs. Sometimes business owners and man-
agers might measure success and progress, in part, by the number of
people they productively employ. They may even set employment tar-
gets and specify time frames in which to meet them. As we are painfully
aware today, the presence or absence of jobs has “direct consequences
for others” and for the “public sphere.” 
Thus, business is the primary driver of the innovation, jobs, and
even revenue on which government and philanthropy depend. Amer-
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ica’s economic, social, and governmental systems all depend funda-
mentally on a business sector that is of “direct consequence to others”
and whose contributions serve the public good and provide social ben-
efits. Without it, the future of all of our systems would be imperiled.
The definition of the “public sphere” must necessarily contemplate
these enterprises.
Yet, no one rationally uses the “public” nature of business as a jus-
tification for legally expanding the transparency requirements on the
business sector as a whole, and no one uses (or should use) this argu-
ment to justify treating private companies in the same way we treat
public ones or government. 
True, there are laws and regulations that apply equally to publicly
held and privately held companies. Among the areas affected are ad-
vertising, debt collection, discriminatory practices, monopolistic be-
havior, taxes, worker safety, environmental practices, and more. (In
fact, many of these rules also apply to foundations and other tax-ex-
empt organizations as well.) But these legal intrusions are not based on
some vague notion of the “public” nature of business—or on any fea-
ture of business as a whole. Instead, these legal intrusions seek to
achieve more narrowly defined objectives that operate at the points at
which these enterprises intersect with the broader society, economy,
and politics. Furthermore, in seeking these objectives, Congress, legis-
latures, regulatory agencies, and courts have attempted, albeit imper-
fectly, to recognize and preserve the autonomous, independent, and
private nature of the for-profit companies on which they impose man-
dates. Thus, debates about the optimal level of transparency in the busi-
ness sector are usually more respectful of nuance and degree than is
normal in discussions of philanthropic transparency. 
Both the for-profit and the philanthropic sectors aim to project a
private vision into the public sphere. While the for-profit sector ex-
pects—even demands—“private benefit,” philanthropy does not and
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cannot.18 But this distinction seems a wholly inadequate reason to neg-
lect the similarities between these sectors, to deny autonomy or privacy
to philanthropic organizations, or to hold philanthropy to standards
of transparency applicable to government. 
C. Transparency to Correct Purported
“Power Asymmetry”
This argument contends that the relationship between
foundations and grantees is unfair—that foundations
make potential grantees ask for money, that founda-
tions can “de-fund” grantees, and that foundation
staffers can abuse their discretion. Still, although there
is no excuse for a lack of respect by foundation staff,
the discretion foundations have is necessary if they are
to fulfill their intended role in our system.
Foundations have money that grantees want. Foundations demand infor-
mation from prospective and actual grant recipients. Foundations have
agendas, networks, and other resources that can substantially influence
grantees.19 It is no surprise then that some people see grantees as system-
atically subordinate to foundations and treat this “power asymmetry”20
as inherently suspect or intrinsically abusive. However, there is more to
the relationship than that. 
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For instance, the above factors that give rise to the “power asym-
metry” label are not unique to the foundation-grantee relationship.
These characterizations can also describe grantee relationships with
government agencies that make grants and charitable giving by busi-
nesses, community foundations, and even individual donors.
Admittedly, there are instances, even too many instances, in
which a specific relationship between a grantor and a grantee reflects
an extreme imbalance of power favoring the grantor. This situation
can arise when people who oversee and manage grantors succumb
to temptations of arrogance, condescension, and egotism.21 Some-
times, grantors can lose sight of the fact that they need grantees to
fulfill their legal obligations and programmatic missions. 
Such distortions can result in grantors’ over-emphasizing form
and process over substantive progress and achievement. They can
forget or neglect the fact that their actions and inactions have real
consequences for those who seek and receive funding and for the
people and causes that they serve. Unduly burdensome application
processes, vague or overly broad missions and strategies, and report-
ing obligations that are disproportionate to the amounts of money
or purposes at issue—these are but three unfortunately too common
examples.
I am not an apologist for disrespectfulness, arrogance, or abusive
behavior. Grantors should treat grant-seekers and recipients with re-
spect. As entities, grantors should ensure that their processes and
practices incorporate these values. As individuals, the people who
staff and represent grantors should do likewise. 
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Grantees, for their part, can also take steps to foster respectful re-
lationships and avoid placing themselves in the role of supplicant. They
can—and do—decide not to apply for grants from certain grantors.22
They can and do refuse grants when conditions are unacceptable, and
they return money if a grantor’s demands become excessive. Although
it can be a hard temptation to resist on the front end, grantees should
try to avoid becoming dependent on funding from just one or a few
sources and should be suspicious when a donor—including the gov-
ernment—offers to provide a large part of their financial support over
a long period of time. At a minimum, they should know that by ac-
cepting money under such circumstances, they substantially increase
the chances that a real “power asymmetry” will result, such as govern-
ment-imposed caps, limits, and prohibitions that are emerging in vari-
ous states on compensation and otherwise. 
Then again, these same cautions apply to many relationships. In
philanthropy as elsewhere, there are people who abuse their positions,
and corrective action by government is sometimes called for. However,
grantees are not in the situation of child and industrial workers at the
end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, or like women and
minorities who were regularly denied the liberty of work or engaging
fully in society and the marketplace. Imbalance and “power asymme-
try” do not by themselves require corrective legal action in the absence
of pervasive abuse evaluated in light of legitimate needs, processes, and
behavior. There are differences between the relative positions of foun-
dations and grantees, and tension inevitably results. These tensions can
be exacerbated for some grant seekers because the information re-
quested, the time taken by foundations to make their decisions, and
the resulting decisions themselves may make grant-seekers upset, hurt,
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or angry. Those reactions are understandable, but that does not mean
that grant seekers must be victims of “power asymmetry.” Instead,
these reactions are better understood, absent actual evidence to the con-
trary, as manifestations of that natural disappointment that inevitably
accompanies choices about allocating limited philanthropic resources
within a bounded set of purposes about which reasonable people can
disagree.
Tension can also arise or grow as those who manage foundations
seek information from grantees in order to fulfill their responsibilities
for ensuring compliance with the law, fealty to donor intent, and fur-
thering philanthropy’s proper roles in society. In light of these obligations,
foundation demands for information and for time to make decisions are
often unavoidable. There is nothing inherently disrespectful or arrogant
about asking for the information needed to differentiate potential recip-
ients from one another, to calculate the opportunity costs associated with
choosing one course of action over another, or to assess potential and
actual outcomes. Nor is it inherently disrespectful or arrogant to take
appropriate amounts of time to conduct these analyses and make the
corresponding decisions. 
Ironically, some of the behaviors that grantees and their advocates
consider abuses of power are in fact efforts by foundations to be more
transparent. Foundations need information and documentation during
the application, reporting, and concluding stages of a grant award or re-
jection in order to complete publicly available tax returns. They use in-
formation, much of it from grant recipients, in order to provide
informative annual reports, maintain useful high-quality websites, and
use social networking tools effectively. Information from grantees is also
critical to enable foundations to assess the effectiveness of their systems
and progress towards fulfilling their programmatic missions. 
Thus, declarations of “power asymmetry” can put foundations in
an untenable, no-win situation. Some criticize foundations for being
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ineffective or not being more open, yet label them as arrogant abusers
of power when they try to get the information they need to assess ef-
fectiveness or provide more disclosures.23
As a practical matter, foundations can help their situation if they
try to minimize misperceptions by communicating and informing as
much as is strategically and reasonably possible. As discussed in chapter
III, voluntary disclosure of certain relevant information about
processes, strategies, and programs can help mitigate hurt and anger
and contribute to the successful management of grantor-grantee rela-
tionships. But even the best of efforts will never eliminate all misper-
ceptions. The only way to avoid causing hurt to grantees and potential
grantees is to give them everything they want, which is neither possible
nor wise. The discipline of making and implementing choices—which
should be strategic, thoughtful, and informed—is among the ways in
which philanthropy fulfills its obligations to the nation. Unfortunately,
downsides will inevitably accompany those choices.
Thus, the “power asymmetry” argument cannot survive as a legit-
imate basis for legal mandates to increase philanthropic openness. 
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D. Transparency as a Tool for Measuring
Effectiveness
This argument claims that the public has a legitimate
interest in assessing philanthropic effectiveness and
that we cannot assess this effectiveness without more
transparency than the law currently requires. The argu-
ment sounds benign, but it suffers from several practi-
cal defects: How would it work in practice? What
organization would define effectiveness? How would
we prevent the organization from becoming a tool of
special interests? What would the legal consequences
be for a deficiency in effectiveness? Would we really
want foundations to insert themselves more deeply
into the affairs of the grantees on whose performance
foundations depend for their effectiveness?
One of the most frequently heard arguments for requiring greater trans-
parency is that openness fosters effectiveness. This argument is particularly
mired in semantic confusion and lack of definitional clarity. For instance,
proponents sometimes use “effectiveness” when they mean “accountabil-
ity” and vice versa.24 They might be advocating that individual foundations
expand their internal knowledge and understanding of themselves or that
society know more about and better understand the sector. Alternatively,
they might be using the language of “effectiveness” as a way to give exter-
nal parties the power or authority to assess effectiveness, express judg-
ments, and perhaps even impose consequences for deemed failure. 
The term “effectiveness” should be used to measure how well or
poorly a person or enterprise operates, whether it has accomplished its
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objectives, or the extent to which it has constructively affected a situa-
tion or made a desired change.25 In general, “effectiveness” is not a legal
concept that carries punitive legal consequences for failure. In theory,
assessing effectiveness can be a perfectly reasonable objective and can
be aided by increased openness, particularly if such openness is volun-
tarily provided individually or as part of a group. But the theory looks
less benign when government, claiming the authority of the tax treat-
ment compact or “public” purpose arguments requires or sets standards
of effectiveness, assesses whether they have been achieved, deems certain
information necessary or relevant for such an assessment, and punishes
failure or rewards success. If that happens, an otherwise innocuous or
potentially useful inquiry into “effectiveness” morphs into a demand
for “accountability” and government meddling.
The term “accountability,” in contrast, should be used to measure
whether the parties to a transaction or compact have abided by its
terms, performed their respective obligations, or delivered agreed-upon
outcomes. Legal accountability, unlike effectiveness, innately carries an
element of consequences and exposure to penalties for failing to adhere,
perform, or deliver as required, regardless of whether one is “effective”
in performing or delivering by some other standard. Thus, an enterprise
can be effective without being accountable and accountable without
being effective. However, to complicate matters still further, if a trans-
action or agreement makes “effectiveness” a requirement, the relevant
party is accountable for its effectiveness and is subject to applicable
consequences for failing to be effective. 
As part of the tax treatment compact discussed previously, exempt
foundations and their managers are, and should be, held accountable
for ensuring that assets are used for charitable purposes and not for
private benefit, impermissible lobbying, or intervention in political
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campaigns. The scope, type, and degrees of disclosure required and the
corresponding consequences for non-compliance should be (and cur-
rently seem to be) specifically designed to ensure such accountability.
“Effectiveness,” however, is not and should not be part of this compact. 
Some proponents of more philanthropic transparency are trying to
change this by injecting “effectiveness” into the compact. The IRS in-
serted (though it eventually withdrew) mandated disclosures targeting
effectiveness into early drafts of proposed revisions to the 990 informa-
tion return filed by public charities—an almost certain precursor of fu-
ture efforts, including with regard to foundations. Although these efforts
implicitly or explicitly require more openness from foundations, there
are several problems with legally mandated transparency for these pur-
poses. Even if effectiveness seems to occupy a relative high ground the-
oretically, as an objective for transparency it is inextricably bound to the
strategies and details of how it would be pursued. When evaluated in
theory and practice, effectiveness does not withstand scrutiny as a legit-
imate objective for expanding philanthropic transparency, particularly
if imposed by government. Among the problems are difficulties with
identifying relevant, uniform standards to apply consistently across the
sector, lack of clarity about who is an appropriate judge of compliance
on behalf of government, and ambiguity about consequences for failure.26
What Standards for Effectiveness? There are no standards in the
law against which to assess the effectiveness of philanthropy. Of course,
such laws or regulations could be drafted, but this course would present
its own problems. First, there is the threshold matter of whether setting
such standards is a proper role for government. Even if it is deemed
proper, there is the question of how far government can go before
destabilizing philanthropy’s roles and responsibilities in our various
systems, including the roles arguably protected by the Constitution.
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Even if those thresholds are met, there is the more practical problem
of designing legal standards that can apply consistently across a diverse
and complex sector.
Foundations are anything but uniform. They vary in the amounts of
their assets and the size and volume of their grants. They pursue a multi-
tude of missions that traverse the entire spectrum of permissible exempt
activities: social services, medical care, humanitarian relief, revitalizing
economically disadvantaged communities, reversing the effects of discrim-
ination, relieving the burdens of government, and more. A few founda-
tions operate through employees; many more rely heavily on volunteers.
Many focus giving on their local communities, while some operate glob-
ally. Foundations also differ in their ambitions and the degree to which
they innovate, pursue their visions creatively, and are willing to experi-
ment and take programmatic risks. Most focus on giving grants, but some
operate their own programs and conduct their own research.
In many ways, such diversity embodies the advantages of pluralism
and operates as a fundamental expression of essentially American val-
ues, principles, and ideals.27
Legally mandated standards of effectiveness that could be relevant
and consistent across such disparate organizations would tend, almost
necessarily, either to cover only the least common denominators, which
would be of limited or no value, or to plunge regulators and philan-
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thropy into a profusion of tailored, customized standards with a high
likelihood of arbitrariness. Before undertaking such a task, it would be
appropriate to ask:
1. Whether the effort required is the best use of limited resources when
compared with other legislative and regulatory priorities
2. Whether the effort and its implementation justify the significant fi-
nancial and other costs
3. Perhaps most important, whether the standards themselves are
likely to be effective
A particular problem with imposing legal standards of effectiveness
in philanthropy is an absence of precedent or authority. For instance,
tax policy generally concerns itself with accountability, not effectiveness.
The government does not ask whether businesses using tax credits for
research on clean energy alternatives are effective in doing so. Govern-
ment does not request grades from individuals who take education ex-
pense deductions in order to ascertain whether these people are
performing up to their potential.28 Government holds businesses and in-
dividuals accountable only for having actually incurred the expenses for
which the beneficial tax treatment is asserted and documenting this fact. 
Similarly, in philanthropy, regulatory oversight appropriately fo-
cuses less on “detecting poor performance” or effectiveness than on
deterring and correcting abuses.29 Indeed, public criticisms, hearings,
commissions, and committees on philanthropy have virtually never
crossed the boundary that would have “led . . . except very marginally,
to any attempt at restricting what a foundation selects as its mission
and how it pursues that mission.”30
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Another, practical problem in setting government-mandated stan-
dards of effectiveness is the danger that such efforts would deprive phi-
lanthropy of flexibility to change direction or even terminate certain
efforts for fear that doing so could be deemed a failure of the original
strategy and, thus, “ineffective.” Foundation boards, managers, and
personnel might remain so focused on original plans that they forgo
new opportunities or neglect new needs because deviations might be
considered ineffective and, therefore, “failure” relative to original
plans, even though the deviations are otherwise successful when meas-
ured against alternative standards. It may be possible to design stan-
dards that address these objections by permitting the needed flexibility
to change, but the exceptions would likely swallow the rule, a strong
indicator that the rule should not have existed in the first place.
Assuming that the substantial hurdles posed by these problems can
be addressed, effectiveness as an objective for transparency still requires
decisions about who legitimately should have authority to adopt stan-
dards, assess compliance, and impose sanctions for violations. 
Who Establishes Standards, Judges Effectiveness, and Im-
poses Consequences? Government certainly has the authority and
even the responsibility to assess the effectiveness of organizations with
which it contracts or to which it makes grants. It should hold those organ-
izations accountable for delivering on the promised outcomes. This mono-
graph does not address the direct contracting relationship, nor does it
address the question of whether government has the power, prospectively,
to narrow the purposes and activities that qualify as tax-exempt, the con-
tributions that may be deducted as charitable, or the expenditures that foun-
dations may count as “qualifying distributions.” In any event, each of these
issues is more a matter of accountability to tax policy than of effectiveness.
The question considered here is not whether government has these
powers but, more specifically, whether government should use the pow-
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ers that it does have to establish standards for philanthropic effective-
ness, assess progress and achievements under these standards, or re-
quire disclosure of information that the government deems relevant for
purposes of allowing third parties to judge philanthropic effectiveness.
One reason often given for government doing these things lies in
the misconception that foundation money is really “public money.”
This argument has been rebutted elsewhere.31
A second reason given is that foundations do not operate under
market discipline or other oversight in the way that for-profit business
or government does. In this view, owners, managers, directors, com-
petitors, creditors, suppliers, employees, communities, the media, and
government deploy various means and techniques of holding business
accountable for effectiveness. If a business is not effective, it risks losing
customers, market share, financing, suppliers, employees, and more.
Although not necessarily accountable to them in a legal sense, a busi-
ness jeopardizes its survival if it chooses to ignore them.
Likewise, voters, campaign contributors, constituents, and the
media hold elected officials accountable for their effectiveness; elected
officials, in turn, hold each other and career government employees ac-
countable. If government is not effective, politicians are not re-elected
and officials can lose their jobs.
In contrast, exempt foundations are legally accountable to the IRS
and the chief charity officials in the states where they operate for com-
pliance with applicable statutes, regulations, and donor intent but not
for whether they are effective in achieving their charitable purposes. As
discussed in chapter I, they have no other external legal “stakeholders”
to satisfy and no non-legal constituencies to serve. If foundations are
not effective, there are no direct consequences imposed by third parties
for the lack of effectiveness. There might be social accountability in the
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form of public pressure, adverse opinions from advocacy groups or
media coverage, and repercussions from watchdog organizations, trade
associations, and peer foundations. There may also be uncomfortable
social situations, including, in the extreme, ostracism of donors and
those who serve as foundation directors, managers, and employees. But
foundations do not act at any externally imposed peril of their existence
for neglecting or ignoring popularity signals or outside groups or, more
positively stated, for taking programmatic risks in order to pursue vi-
sionary and innovative approaches to social problems.32
These opportunities for steadfastness in the face of public opposi-
tion and contrary popular opinion are among the most important con-
structive characteristics of philanthropy and its unique roles in this
country, but calls for broadly increased transparency to enhance phil-
anthropic effectiveness risk undermining this virtue.33 Changing the cur-
rent dynamic will require fabricating an artificial and unnatural
“market” where none exists. It will involve devising “stakeholders” or
“constituents” and bestowing powers on them—with attendant risks
and consequences, including the not-unlikely deterioration of the es-
sential character of American philanthropy. 
Even if legislators or regulators decide that the risks and conse-
quences are worth it, there remains the issue of who should be charged
with responsibility for the effort and its implementation. It would be
32 See Caroline Preston, “Some 70% of Grant Makers Say Foundations Have Few Measures
to Test Effectiveness,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, June 14, 2010. Tellado urges the pro-
vision of more information to “grantees and others who have a big stake in our work.”
Marta L. Tellado, “How Can Foundations Demystify Their Work?” Chronicle of Philan-
thropy, June 15, 2010. In contrast, Marker distinguishes the presence of stakeholders in
public charities and foundations from the absence of such stakeholders in private foun-
dations. Marker, “Public Role in Foundation Decision-Making.”
33. Depending on the extent and degree of the changes imposed, such efforts could also risk
undermining the First Amendment and violating Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tections. Moreover, to the extent that foundations are an extension of fundamental prin-
ciples of property rights, such efforts could have broader and more significant
consequences for the country’s political and economic system as a whole.
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another in a line of ironies to make government the judge of organiza-
tional effectiveness. Even so, Congress could establish general standards
but would not likely have the time or inclination to make rules in mean-
ingful detail given other priorities. Congress could authorize the IRS
to undertake the job, but the IRS is already falling short in various as-
pects of its operations. Alternatively, Congress could create a new fed-
eral agency, but funding for such an agency would be only one of
several potential problems. Congress could vest regulatory power in
private associations or watchdog groups but, if history is a guide, it is
almost inevitable that vested, empowered, and entrenched interests will
favor self-preservation and the status quo over sound policy. Even if
regulatory posts were initially populated by people everyone would
agree are reasonable, it is unlikely that the posts would always (or even
usually) be filled by such reasonable people. Basing long-term policy
on the virtuousness of current personalities is never a good idea. 
Furthermore, each of these approaches poses substantial dangers.
One such danger is the prospect of politicizing specific foundations and
philanthropy generally—an already-existing threat, given current at-
tacks from each side of the political spectrum on charities perceived as
sympathetic to the other side. To be useful and long-lasting, any stan-
dards of philanthropic effectiveness and their implementation would
need to apply without regard to affiliations, messages, or mission-fit
along the political spectrum, and they must survive changes in political
power. Regularly changing or inconsistently applied standards will
themselves cause foundations and the sector to be ineffective—an ironic
result, given that the stated objective of the effort is ultimately to im-
prove philanthropic effectiveness. 
Other dangers could include diminishing or destroying the ability
to criticize government and business, subjugating missions and donor
intent to popular pressures and fads, and threatening the capacity to
innovate, take risks, and operate with flexibility and long-term time
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horizons.34 These are likely outcomes and losses if government asserts
unchallenged authority to assess effectiveness of philanthropy broadly,
and the likelihood turns to certainty with the introduction of conse-
quences for failure. 
What are the Consequences for Failing to be Effective, and
Who Imposes Them? The problems associated with government
meddling in philanthropic effectiveness are exacerbated when “effec-
tiveness” is transformed into “accountability” by adding an expectation
of actual, implied, or merely threatened consequences for “ineffective-
ness.” A system of legal accountability and government-imposed con-
sequences gives rise to problems of identifying appropriate punishments
for failing to operate effectively (whatever that means) and considering
the potential effects of such punishments, narrowly on philanthropy and
more broadly on our social, economic, and political systems.35
Among the outcomes for imposing such consequences could be in-
creased deference to tax lawyers and accountants, “safer” grantmak-
ing, a tendency to pursue only those programs that are currently
popular or at least noncontroversial, and an absence of support for in-
novation and programmatic risk-taking.36 Deference to risk-averse pro-
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34. The government is “neither politically nor legally equipped to do more than ask if the
mission is in the public good and then hope that the mission is more or less realized”;
“[n]either is the government likely to ask the efficiency question. . . . There is simply no
conceptual or empirical base on which to do so. If political agreement on what constitutes
good works is elusive, even more so would be the metric for measuring its realization.
The government is not even able to measure its own performance.” Prewitt, “American
Foundations,” 42, 43. 
35. “Transparency is only the first step in a longer journey to accountability” in which a foun-
dation must ‘answer for what it does (or doesn’t) do.’” Kevin Laskowski, “Please Tap the
Glass (Pockets),” National Committee on Responsive Philanthropy blog, May 6, 2010.
See also Brody, “Sunshine and Shadows,” 40. Some members of the Independent Sector
Panel on the Nonprofit Sector “were disappointed that the [Report’s] principles were pre-
catory only” and were lacking the force of law.
36. Since tax lawyers and accountants encouraged only the “most obviously safe” grants, a
tendency arose for foundations to let lawyers and accountants “make their charitable
judgments for them.” Frumkin, Trouble in Foundationland, 39.
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37. The IRS can “drive behavior merely by asking about specific governance practices.” IRS Ad-
visory Committee, Report of Recommendations, 52, 56. “[S]imply by asking questions . . .
the Service sends a strong signal of their desirability.” Brody, “Sunshine and Shadows,” 2.
38. Brody, “Sunshine and Shadows,” 46; see also Internal Revenue Service Form 990 (2008).
Sections A, B, and C of Part VI of the Form entitled “Governance, Management, and Dis-
closure” seek “information about policies not required by the Internal Revenue Code.”
39. See Marcus S. Owens, “Charities and Governance: Is the IRS Subject to Challenge?” Tax
Analysts, November 12, 2008. 
fessionals and moves to safety became more common following the
changes in private foundation rules made by the Tax Reform Act of
1969. Similar changes could be expected to arise if legal consequences
were to be imposed for “ineffectiveness.” Of course, there are those
who would welcome such an outcome: They would be happy to see
foundations making more conventional grants for more traditionally
charitable purposes instead of more adventurous, innovative grantmak-
ing. As a matter of donor intent, making such choices is to be encour-
aged. As a matter of government coercion, however, it is a problem,
whether undertaken directly by force of law or the result of a less direct,
government-inspired race to safety. 
The mere fact that a legislative committee or federal oversight
agency asks or suggests something, even without acting formally, may
be persuasive by itself.37 Ambiguity about what consequences, if any,
may flow from a violation can also be influential. For instance, public
charities are required to file an annual Form 990 information return.
In recent years, the IRS has substantially modified the form to add
questions about governance, with predictable results. As the Form 990
and its instructions state, the governance matters about which the IRS
inquires are not items required by federal law.38 Indeed, a former direc-
tor of the exempt organizations division of the IRS, Marcus Owens,
has pointed out that it is, at best, unclear whether these inquiries are
even within the authority of the IRS.39 Moreover, the questions may en-
croach on principles of federalism and the responsibilities of the states.
But by merely asking the governance questions, the IRS sends a pow-
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erful message about its expectations, especially with those questions
that are framed to make clear what the “right” answer is. 
The charitable sector has obliged by answering these questions,
even though (or maybe because), with one exception, the consequences
for failing to answer are not clear. The exception is significant: The IRS
has stated that it intends to use these answers to help it determine what
charities to audit. Thus, negative answers or blank spaces increase the
chances of an IRS encounter—a powerful incentive for an organization
to make sure it can answer the questions in ways that meet the IRS’
expectations, whether or not they are in the best interests of the entity.
Aside from using ambiguity to change behavior, any number of
punishments can be contemplated for a foundation that is deemed “in-
effective” even though it has otherwise complied with the letter and
spirit of the law. Should there be fines? Excise taxes? Should they be
assessed against the organization, thus reducing the amounts available
to spend for charitable purposes? Or should they be assessed against
the individuals responsible for ensuring “effectiveness,” thus discour-
aging participation? Should there be public reprimands from govern-
ment? Should government be able to replace directors, officers, or
managers? Should exemptions be revoked? What role, if any, is there
for the courts? How far is too far in punishing failure to meet govern-
ment-designed or adopted standards of “effectiveness”? 
The last question—how far is too far—is particularly important
when considered in light of the fact that, for a grantmaking foundation,
programmatic effectiveness is usually beyond its control.40 The effec-
tiveness of philanthropy depends substantially on the performance of
grant recipients. Thus, in any evaluation of effectiveness, foundations
and their personnel risk being punished for the performance of others.
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40. See Frumkin, Trouble in Foundationland, 30, 65. Frumkin outlines the reliance of foun-
dations on the work of others and the difficulty of attributing foundation effectiveness of
actions of its staff. In focusing on outcomes, many a critic “holds nonprofits responsible
for factors beyond their control.” Brody, “Sunshine and Shadows,” 8.
78
Transparency in Philanthropy
The possibility of this kind of vicarious liability might prompt foun-
dations to become more involved in the day-to-day operations of their
grant recipients. Grantees who object to foundation involvement at
current levels would certainly consider this an especially undesirable
outcome. Alternatively, more foundations might begin operating their
own programs and giving fewer grants to others. 
Other possibilities are equally unappealing. If compliance burdens
turned foundations to increasingly safe, short-term, measurable activi-
ties, society could be denied untold benefits and advances in human wel-
fare.41 In addition, foundations and donors could find it more difficult
to attract competent, much less extraordinary, people to serve as direc-
tors, officers, and key employees. Potential donors could find it consid-
erably less attractive to endow philanthropic enterprises in the United
States in the future, a prospect with its own significant consequences.
Each of these asserted rationales—transparency as an end in itself,
transparency to ensure so called public good and social benefit, trans-
parency to rectify purported power asymmetry, and transparency to
enable assessments of “effectiveness”—is rife with fatal difficulties as
an objective for mandating greater transparency in philanthropy be-
yond what is necessary to demonstrate compliance with the tax treat-
ment compact. Scratching the surface of each assertion reveals too
many unanswered questions, too much confusion, and too many sub-
stantial problems, among them a lack of discipline in terminology, lack
of respect for degrees, and lack of adequate consideration of the impact
on roles and responsibilities. Thus, adopting any of these as an objec-
tive justifying a demand for more expansive transparency in philan-
thropy would not be good. 
41. See Frumkin, Trouble in Foundationland, 281.
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Chapter III
Voluntary Philanthropic
Transparency: Telling
Your Story and Keeping
Public Trust
Today, calculations about the degree of transparency in
which a foundation should engage are more than a mat-
ter of law. We live in a world of instant communications,
and of direct democracy via the internet and social
media. Every foundation that wants to be effective must
take the power of communications into account—to de-
fine itself positively and to avoid allowing others to do
the defining. Foundations should provide information
about the good they do, should build a reputation that
can withstand attacks and, when it is appropriate, should
use communications to increase their effectiveness.
However inappropriate it may be for more laws and regulations to im-
pose greater openness on and disclosures from philanthropy, there are
legitimate, valuable reasons for individual foundations to make strate-
gic and thoughtful decisions, as appropriate to their circumstances, to
be more open and to disclose more information than the law requires.
Some of the reasons are constructive and advance the relevance of phi-
lanthropy, while others are more defensive and counter criticisms and
attacks on philanthropy. 
Some critics and opponents target philanthropy broadly, while oth-
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ers focus on specific foundations or types of entities, such as founda-
tions that are large or are controlled by the donor’s family members or
operate internationally.1 Some critics question the contributions of phi-
lanthropy, financial and non-financial, to our society. Others recognize
the potential value of those contributions and even acknowledge their
historic usefulness but assert that foundations are failing to live up to
legitimate expectations. Still other critics favor more immediate spend-
ing of foundation funds to address short-term needs. 
Some critics and detractors decry concentrations of wealth and seek
its redistribution2—often according to their own preferred priorities,
which may or may not be self-serving. Some believe that foundations
should be “democratic” and that their lack of representativeness in
terms of programs and personnel is contrary to the nation’s political
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1. There is a difference between constructive critics and detractors. Both may be found inside
and outside the philanthropic sector. Critics generally value foundations and philanthropy
and seek to help them improve the ways in which they function and fulfill their responsi-
bilities, with appropriate respect for their autonomy and independence. Detractors, on
the other hand (particularly at the extreme), strive to re-fashion philanthropy and foun-
dations to serve their particular agendas and preferences. Sometimes critics are misper-
ceived as detractors; sometimes detractors disguise themselves as critics. The confusion
has sometimes caused potentially valuable ideas to be misunderstood as dangerous. A dis-
tinction between critics and detractors could often be a matter of apparent motives. Some
may be motivated by principled convictions about how society should function or by a
conviction that fraud pervades human nature. Others may simply have had bad experi-
ences with foundations, such as the rejection of a grant request or the termination of a
grant, or may be moved by the prospect of consulting or business fees. This list does not
purport to be exhaustive or even authoritative, and the likely reality is that a variety of
experiences and philosophies motivate critics and detractors just as a combination of ven-
erable and nefarious factors move defenders and advocates of foundations and philan-
thropy. An appreciation of these various motives may help to distinguish between critics
and detractors and give proper weight to the positions they expound.
2. See National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy (NCRP), Criteria for Philanthropy
at Its Best: Benchmarks to Assess and Enhance Grantmaker Impact (2009); Pablo Eisen-
berg, “Making a Difference,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, May 27, 2010; and Mark Rosen-
man, Foundations for the Common Good (Washington: Caring to Change, 2010).
Whether they are relying on their own persuasive abilities or calling for government im-
position of quotas, ratios, and other mandatory distributions is often unclear. Foundations
should not be immune to the former, but the latter requires active counter-measures to
preserve the character and roles of American philanthropy. 
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principles. Still others want foundations to focus solely on alleviating
poverty and remedying social injustice as they conceive it.
None of the lists above is exhaustive, and not all of the reasons will
appeal to or motivate every foundation—nor should they. Foundations
operate in numerous unique and varied incarnations. Each foundation’s
decision to evaluate the question of expanding openness and disclosure
should be made in light of the factors most relevant to the specific cir-
cumstances that define its character, serve its purposes, and most in-
fluence its operations. Foundations’ chosen methods for pursuing
greater openness and disclosures should be similarly customized. 
Among the factors to be considered are the following: 
• Donor intent, mission, and prioritized strategies 
• Willingness to engage in policy research, advocacy, and education
• Geographic scope of operations
• Nature of relationships with grantees and other collaborators
• Capacities and competencies of staff and whether it is paid or
volunteer, full-time or part-time
• Size of endowment
• Investment policies and practices
• Time horizon for existence, whether in perpetuity or limited-term
• Time horizons for grant and operational commitments, whether
single-year or multi-year, and how far into the future
• Willingness to incur expenses for planning and evaluation
• Commitment to internal discipline and consistency of practices
There are other considerations as well, including effects on donors
and their families, grant recipients, and those who contract with a foun-
dation. There also are the inevitable unknown and unknowable conse-
quences. Ideally, choosing more openness and disclosure will
contemplate all of these factors and their relative priorities. In theory
if not in practice, these various factors and relationships should be con-
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sidered both as they currently exist and as aspirations of the donor and
the foundation’s board members, officers and managers. 
How a foundation considers and addresses the above factors, indi-
vidually and in the aggregate, will define that foundation’s philosophy
and culture, not just with regard to openness and disclosure but also
more broadly. Whether done intentionally and strategically or by acci-
dent and happenstance, a philosophy and culture will be created and
perpetuated. The approach to openness and disclosure will be an inte-
gral part of both. 
As with most decisions, balances must be struck and benefits and
costs weighed. Also, these types of decisions are not usually made for
all time but should be revisited periodically in light of changed circum-
stances. In that way, the currency, accuracy, and relevance of previously
presumed values, benefits, and costs can be affirmed or modified in
light of new potential opportunities and threats. 
A. Benefits of More Expansive Voluntary
Disclosure 
There are at least three reasons why foundations may wish to decide vol-
untarily to share more information. First, and crucially, such a decision
gives foundations the opportunity to exercise more control over the in-
formation available to the public, including control over the accuracy of
the information, its presentation, and its context. Second, it can con-
tribute to building, maintaining, and enhancing reputation and credibil-
ity. Third, it can increase administrative efficiency and opportunities for
collaboration, which can help leverage foundation assets and outcomes. 
Information is ubiquitous, and its omnipresence can be insidious.
It used to be that the most likely sources of broadly disseminated mis-
information were print media, television, radio, and word of mouth.
Today, the sources have expanded to include webpages, blogs and com-
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ments, tweets, Facebook posts, open-source media, email, cable televi-
sion channels, talk radio, and more. The ethical and professional stan-
dards that historically applied in credible journalism do not generally
apply in these broader media of expression, and the convergence of
journalism with entertainment has made it harder to tell where such
standards apply at all.
Foundations and philanthropy are not immune from the damage
that can now be caused by anyone with an opinion who is willing to
state it widely and repeatedly and without regard to whether the opin-
ion is informed or credible.3 When such opinions are expressed, if foun-
dations and philanthropy have not already acted affirmatively to
populate the technological ether with relevant, reliable information ap-
propriate to their circumstances, they may find themselves in the un-
tenable position of trying to undo damage that has already been done
to reputations, programs, and more. 
This is not to suggest that every foundation should disclose every-
thing—or even anything. Instead, it is to encourage foundations to con-
sider the risk of others’ disseminating misinformation and the benefits
of strategies to ensure that accurate, appropriate information has al-
ready educated those who matter most. The aim is for the foundation
to build a reputation capable of withstanding attacks, whether inad-
vertent or malicious.
The tools and vehicles that can be used to attack can also be com-
bined with other strategies to circulate accurate information in proper
context. Such information can better inform policymakers, grantees, and
the public about how individual foundations and philanthropists pursue
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3. “[A]s information becomes more ubiquitous in the age of web 2.0, it becomes important
to tell your own story.” Foundation Center, “Too Small to Have a Website,” Philantopic,
May 12, 2010. “No sector—government, church, business, or charitable—gets a free pass
in the world of 24/7 media blogs, YouTube, Twitter, crowd sourcing, and digital every-
thing.” Aaron Dorfman, “A New Portal for Philanthropic Transparency,” Huffington
Post, February 9, 2010.
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their charitable purposes and, by doing so, fulfill their social, economic,
and political roles and responsibilities. Expanding this type of knowledge
can also decrease the mystery that sometimes shrouds these enterprises.
In addition, greater disclosure about grantmaking processes can
contribute to a more efficient allocation of a foundation’s resources,
including money and personnel.4 Communicating a foundation’s mis-
sion and strategy can reduce the volume of requests that do not “fit,”
particularly if the mission and strategy are clear and disciplined in the
first place. Foundation personnel will be able to focus their time and
energy on making the more important and already hard decisions about
selecting from among qualified organizations and activities that com-
plement the foundation’s own goals. 
The same purpose can be served by promulgating application
processes, including details about the information, data, and materials
that are required. The foundation should first ensure that it is requiring
applicants to submit only what is relevant and necessary for its legiti-
mate purposes. Disseminating its information requirements can save
large amounts of time and grief for grant-seekers and foundation per-
sonnel. 
Disseminating information about grants that have already been made
can be equally useful. A foundation’s grant history can provide examples
for prospective grantees who are trying to focus their own time and en-
ergy on placing their requests where they are most likely to be funded.
Greater degrees of openness and disclosure also can help militate against
grantee dependency and feelings of entitlement. When a foundation decides
to change the ways in which it allocates resources, what once seemed like
a mutually beneficial and cordial relationship can quickly deteriorate into
a clash between the foundation and “constituencies” or “stakeholders”
whose interest is in preserving the status quo and who can believe they have
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liefs,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, February 20, 2011.
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been empowered in some fashion. Such clashes and the situations that give
rise to them can damage autonomy, credibility, and reputations. 
How a foundation approaches public engagement and disclosure
can either foster or prevent such problems, depending on how the activ-
ities are conducted and their timing. Not even the best-executed strategies
for openness and engagement under such circumstances can guarantee
that there will not be problems, but openness and disclosure can help
avert problems if the foundation is consistently disciplined in its processes
and communications and clear about its mission, strategies, application
and assessment processes, and individual authority or lack of authority
to make and communicate decisions. The likelihood of problems can also
be minimized with information on the extent to which the foundation
does or does not intend to be a long-term funder of particular grantees. 
However, attempts at openness can contribute to problems rather than
avert them if such attempts are inconsistent or undertaken too late and only
defensively to undo prior silence or ineffective communications. Openness
and engagement done badly can also be perceived as undue deference, an
abdication of authority, or an apparent vesting of authority that does not
actually exist. Examples of engagement that might give rise to notions of
abdication or vesting could include creating ex officio positions on a foun-
dation board for grantees or public officials or having board members rep-
resent the general community or specific interests or constituencies rather
than the foundation as a whole.5 Grantmaking by crowd can also leave
these unfortunate impressions when done too broadly or too often. 
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5. Any given donor may want such a board. But for several decades, donors have had the
option of putting their contributions in donor-advised funds or other community founda-
tion vehicles overseen by such boards. If a donor has instead chosen a private foundation,
it may be reasonably presumed from the donor’s selection of the foundation form that he
or she wants a board that serves the interests of the foundation, not of the “community”
or fictitious “stakeholders” or “constituents.” Cf. Aaron Dorfman, “The Giving Pledge:
Dangerous Implications for Democratic Decision-Making,” Huffington Post, December
21, 2010. “[S]ome forward-thinking foundations share power with communities by in-
cluding grantees or the constituent perspective on their boards.” 
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Thoughtfully communicating information about strategic outcomes
and results can also help manage these problems and contribute to more
efficient operations. A foundation might provide information about les-
sons learned from the success or failure of initiatives, programs, or spe-
cific grants.6 Doing so can be helpful in numerous ways. Among these
are identifying opportunities for collaboration, coordinated efforts,
leverage, and access to networks.7 Disclosing successes can help other
foundations, public charities, government, and even business better tar-
get similar efforts. Disclosure of failures, as has been advocated, can
provide insight and guidance to others about what to avoid and what
variables they might try to change. Such disclosures also can reduce re-
dundancy and, thus, help allocate resources more effectively. 
In undertaking these efforts, foundations also should try to under-
stand and predict the ways in which their information is likely to be used
and conduct their analysis and develop their strategies accordingly. For
instance, a foundation might want to consider with special care the con-
sequences of disclosing failures in a context of demands that foundations
and their personnel be held “accountable” for their “effectiveness.” 
These are among the benefits that foundations might weigh when
voluntarily undertaking openness not required by law. These benefits
are not absolute or unqualified, and foundation personnel should ex-
ercise prudence when accepting the risks of disclosure, including an
awareness of undesirable or unintended outcomes.
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(New York: Carnegie Corporation, 2003), 7. 
7. For an argument advocating for the coordination of efforts with government, see Vartan
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thropy and Government?” Grantcraft, 2010. For an essay arguing for the importance of
information to solve problems and coordinate services, see Cinthia Schuman Ottinger,
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Philanthropy, February 7, 2010. 
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B. Cautions Regarding Expansive 
Voluntary Disclosure
A foundation that has decided to undertake more volun-
tary disclosure must be mindful of several things: infor-
mation about not-so-successful outcomes may give
ammunition to those who want to brand the foundation
as ineffective; information provided in an indiscriminate
way may harm grantees, contractors, and donors and
their families; and voluntary disclosure is not without costs
in terms of finances, administration, and opportunities.
Every decision about openness and disclosures, even a decision to maintain
the status quo, has consequences. Some are predictable, others are unin-
tended, and still more are unknowable. In addition to affecting the founda-
tion and philanthropy in general, increased openness and disclosures can
affect foundation employees, donors and their families; grant recipients, con-
tracting parties, and their respective employees and beneficiaries; and possi-
bly even those who are served by such parties. How a foundation thinks
about potential consequences can help shape the way in which it approaches
openness and disclosure and the consequences with which it must then deal. 
One wholly foreseeable and likely unavoidable consequence of
greater openness and disclosure, whether voluntary or mandatory, is
that it will increase the amount of money and time spent on adminis-
tration, management, and non-program activities. Such costs are real
and can be material. Thus, they should be incurred only in pursuit of
corresponding strategic value for the foundation and its purposes and
not merely as exercises in self-indulgence or to satisfy some mythical
notion of accountability or some imagined, artificial constituency.
These and other costs should be part of any calculation of the benefits
and risks of voluntary openness beyond legal requirements.
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Donors and Their Families. The law requires that foundations re-
port and disclose certain information about substantial contributors,
and donors themselves often publicly reveal information about their
donations. But in making a donation and thereby relinquishing discre-
tion and control over the donated assets, donors have not thereby also
automatically given up their rights or expectations of privacy or per-
sonal safety for themselves and their families.8 At a very practical level,
they may want to preserve at least some degree of privacy so they are
not bombarded by others who want contributions from them.9 They
may also need to protect themselves and their families from threats to
their physical health and safety.
Anonymity may be important to donors for other reasons as well.10
Religious tenets or principles of faith and spirituality may be among the
motivations for donor generosity. Anonymity is frequently integral to
these tenets and principles and, thus, may legitimately constrain certain
public disclosures. A donor may forgo publicity and recognition in order
to avoid the attendant temptation to pride and egotism. Donors also
sometimes avoid publicity or ask that their foundations do so in order
to emphasize the work and results of their grant recipients.11 Such mod-
esty has the additional benefit of dampening the sense of self-importance
to which foundation personnel can sometimes be prone. Even so, it
might be wise to consider explaining the reasons for quiet or silent grant
making so that ulterior motives are not as easily ascribed to fill the void. 
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8. See Bradford Smith, “Transparency: One Size Does Not Fit All,” Philantopic, February
9, 2010; and Joe Mont, “What’s in a Name? Debate for Philanthropists,” The Street, Feb-
ruary 24, 2011.
9. See Stephen Greene, “A Donor’s Obsession with Secrecy,” Chronicle of Philanthropy,
February 6, 1997. A donor demanded anonymity after a “flood of solicitations from nu-
merous organizations” following publicity about a substantial contribution.
10. Ibid.; and Stephen Greene, “For Anonymous Donors, Offshore Philanthropy Can Be Ap-
pealing,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, February 6, 1997. Foundations outside United States
have advantages, including privacy, for those willing to forgo tax exemptions and deductions. 
11. See Smith, “Transparency: One Size Does Not Fit All.” 
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Ulterior motives can exist for wanting anonymity just as such mo-
tives can drive certain rationales for wanting more information about
foundations and their donors. Among such less-than-pure motives are
greed, retaliation for rejected proposals or terminated grants, opposi-
tion to a foundation’s missions, strategies, or grantees, or the desire to
raise funds through litigation.12 Although such motivations can some-
times produce useful outcomes, they should not normally be tolerated,
especially if they pose risks to donors and their families, foundations
and their employees, or philanthropy in general.13
Anonymity is increasingly difficult in our age of omnipresent, undis-
ciplined, and often unreliable information. There are benefits in choos-
ing to compromise anonymity voluntarily and by degrees with public
disclosures beyond those required by law. Those benefits, though, must
be balanced with the potential for negative consequences for donors
and their families.
Grant Recipients and Contracting Parties. In some cases, disclo-
sure can have undesirable consequences for organizations that accept
grants from or contract with a foundation.14 As with donors and their
families, consequences for grant recipients and contracting parties and
their employees can include concerns about privacy and security, par-
ticularly for senior management and board members. We saw an ex-
ample of this danger in California in 2010, when a heavily armed
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12. John Gamboa, the head of the Greenlining Institute in 2008, stated that the Institute does
not pursue foundation grants “because we don’t want foundations to . . . limit us to what
issues we can go after, like going after foundations. Most of our money comes from the
lawsuits we take on.” Bradley Center, Mandating Multicultural Munificence? (transcript,
Washington: Hudson Institute, 2008). 
13. Another motive not to be tolerated is the desire to use foundations to pursue private ben-
efit (including unreasonable compensation for directors, employees, or contractors) or
otherwise undermine foundations’ roles and responsibilities.
14. NCRP’s agenda seeks “benchmarks” for the “common good” and advocates for “open
approaches to grantmaking.” Aaron Dorfman, “Foundations Need to Think Hard About
Their Blind Spots,” Chronicle of Philanthropy, April 23, 2009. 
90
person was stopped by police reportedly on his way to foundations and
charities whose work he found distasteful.15 In the United States, this
is an extreme and, hopefully, isolated case; but the potential for such
threats and harm may be greater in certain other parts of the world
where foundations and grantees operate. In 2011, in response to an
IRS invitation for comments on its proposal to require more identifying
information on Form 990 about foreign grantees, the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America sent a letter pointing to precisely these
types of threats. The degree of personal risk should obviously be con-
sidered when making decisions about greater disclosure.
In less hazardous but still damaging ways, releasing information
about grantees and contractors—including proposals or reports from
them, decisions about them, or assessments of their performance—
could affect their reputations and programs and even beneficiaries of
their services. Limited resources regularly force foundations to decide
not to fund a substantial number of high-quality, worthwhile proposals
from well-run, successful organizations, even when the proposals are
consistent with foundation missions and strategies.16 Even though the
reasons for not funding a proposal may be valid by any measure, pub-
licizing the rejection could inadvertently inspire others to make similar
refusals by relying solely or too heavily on the particular foundation’s
decision not to fund.17
Transparency in Philanthropy
15. See Naimah Jabali-Nash, “California Highway Gunman Byron Williams Aimed for ‘Rev-
olution,’ Say Cops,” CBS News, July 21, 2010.
16. “[A] foundation that must deny ninety requests for every one that is accepted . . . has se-
vere limits on its ability to ‘win friends and influence people.” Homer C. Wadsworth,
“Private Foundations and the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Law and Contemporary Problems
39, no. 1 (Winter 1975): 259.
17. This phenomenon is the flip side of the desire of many grantees to acknowledge their con-
tributors—including foundations—publicly, so that the donor names, individually or in
the aggregate, will influence others to give. This is particularly true with formal fundraising
campaigns and early efforts to attract funders whom the community is likely to perceive
as diligent and credible. Such credibility, grantees hope, will make other potential con-
tributors more likely to give.
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Making the reasons for the rejection public could mitigate the prob-
lems; but there are many valid reasons for rejection, some of which can
be highly critical of an applicant. Rejection may not be based on the
foundation’s limited resources alone or its internal assessment of pro-
grammatic risk. It may also be based on information about or percep-
tions of the applicant’s past performance, capacity, fiscal controls,
efficiency, or personnel. Disclosing this information or perceptions,
which may not be based on complete information, could unfairly harm
an organization’s reputation and ability to raise funds and provide serv-
ices. It could also unduly tarnish the organization’s directors and per-
sonnel. Depending on the nature of the information disclosed, a
foundation and its personnel could even find themselves spending time,
energy, and resources to defend against causes of action for defamation.
It seems that there is very little to be gained and a lot of harm risked in
pursuing these types of disclosures. 
Similar problems can arise from publicizing assessments of grants
programs, initiatives, and strategies.18 However, these concerns diminish
to the extent that the information is increasingly anonymous and gener-
alized or the number of recipients of the information is limited. Assess-
ments of how a foundation strategy might have achieved better outcomes
in general are less likely to cause problems than are assessments of spe-
cific grantees or contractors (though such assessments may, as discussed
above, affect evaluations of the effectiveness and accountability of the
grantors themselves). Widely distributed critiques of specific grantees or
contractors and their personnel or activities are more likely to be prob-
lematic than are targeted, discrete conversations with a few select people,
though even private conversations are not wholly without risk.
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18. “Whatever someone elects to support, others will question or challenge that choice or al-
location.” Curtis W. Meadows Jr., Philanthropic Choice and Donor Intent: Freedom, Re-
sponsibility and Public Interest, (Washington: Center for Public and Nonprofit Leadership,
Georgetown University, 2002), 7.
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Thus, inviting the public into a private foundation’s decision-making
and evaluation, whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, can
have undesirable repercussions for grantees, applicants, contractors, and
their respective programs and personnel. Even if unintended, certain
consequences are reasonably predictable, and a foundation should con-
sider them when voluntarily pursuing greater openness and disclosure.
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Conclusion
Transparency in philanthropy is complicated. It can be deployed ap-
propriately and thereby strengthen philanthropy’s unique functionality,
or it can be used to weaken or even destroy it and its contributions to
our various systems. Consequently, it is an important enough subject
so that its complexity deserves acknowledgement and respect. Unless
there is greater discipline and clarity as discussions continue about
transparency in philanthropy, we may see an emergence of policies and
practices that fundamentally change the ways philanthropy fulfills its
roles in our social, economic, and political systems to the detriment of
those systems. Some may intentionally seek that outcome, and they
should be clear about their cause. 
What should be more clear now is that, in the current tax environ-
ment, there are reasonable degrees of transparency that are appropriate
for ensuring accountability to the conditions for tax exemptions and
charitable deductions. There may be disputes about some of the details,
but it is not inappropriate to require that foundations make certain in-
formation and data available to support their compliance with the tax
treatment compact. Therefore, the tax compact offers the clearest, most
reliable basis for asserting legal accountability. Accompanying that
compact, however, are its too frequently forgotten limits on what gov-
ernment may demand in the name of tax-favored treatment, and failure
to abide by those boundaries could undermine philanthropy and even
the role of government itself.
It should also be clearer that foundations may voluntarily choose
to be more open about their operations and decision-making than may
be required by law. When pursued strategically, thoughtfully, and with
mindfulness of potential consequences, degrees of greater openness can
have advantages for foundations and philanthropy more generally.
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Those advantages can range from certain gains in operational efficiency
to less concrete benefits in terms of reputation and credibility. 
What should be less clear is the attractiveness of certain frequently
asserted objectives for philanthropic transparency that are too often
presented as if presumptively valid. For instance, transparency does not
suffice as a legitimate end unto itself but is always in service to some
other valid goal, even when applied to the frequently invoked compar-
isons with government and publicly traded companies. Pursuit of “pub-
lic good” and “social benefit” lacks disciplined justification for more
expansive philanthropic openness. Purported power asymmetry in the
grantor-grantee relationship also fails, in part because it is a position
that overreaches and can be circular in attacking at one moment what
it demands in another. Finally, it should be clear that effectiveness,
whether in its own right or as a proxy for accountability, suffers from
numerous defects that make it a questionable objective for mandating
greater philanthropic transparency. 
In all respects, conversations about transparency should facilitate
the ways philanthropy fulfills its unique roles in our social, economic,
and political systems rather than undermining its performance. The
preceding four arguments suffer from too many faults to meet that as-
piration, frequently because they conflate philanthropy with govern-
ment and ignore philanthropy’s similarities to business. Whereas
government is mostly public and business is mostly private, philan-
thropy is far less public and far more private than government and less
private and more public than business. 
As such, philanthropy reflects both the private values of donors and
their private decision-making and the public needs of society, such that
“something significant is lost” when both are not simultaneously present,
with the result being an undesirably “safe but bland philanthropic ag-
nosticism”1 that risks falling short of its responsibilities. There has been
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much in discussions of philanthropic transparency that tends to be overly
deferential to the “public” side of the equation and seems prepared to
sacrifice the vitality and fundamental character of the “private” side. 
The conditions of the tax treatment compact and attorney general
oversight of fiduciary duties and donor intent help ensure the presence
of the public side, but there is little but philanthropy itself and those
who value it to protect the “private” side. Thus, as with the freedom
and liberty we as a nation enjoy, vigilance is also important to preserv-
ing the freedom, liberty, and corresponding responsibilities that char-
acterize our nation’s conception of philanthropy. Such vigilance must
ensure that discussions about transparency in philanthropy do not de-
viate from limited applications that strengthen philanthropy or stray
into areas that are likely, at best, to neutralize philanthropy—and may
even be harmful and destructive. 
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fectiveness and accountability, which make it harder to connect values of donors that are
“so critical to philanthropy with public purposes that are the objects of the donation.”
Thus, donor values are “squeezed out of institutional giving,” resulting in a “remarkable
level of agreement and complacency . . . hardly a recipe for achieving philanthropic break-
throughs.” Peter Frumkin, Trouble in Foundationland: Looking Back, Looking Ahead
(Washington: Hudson Institute, 2004), 29–30, 36.
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About The Philanthropy
Roundtable
The Philanthropy Roundtable is America’s leading network of charitable
donors working to strengthen our free society, uphold donor intent, and
protect the freedom to give. Our members include individual philan-
thropists, families, and private foundations.
Mission
The Philanthropy Roundtable’s mission is to foster excellence in 
philanthropy, to protect philanthropic freedom, to assist donors in
achieving their philanthropic intent, and to help donors advance liberty,
opportunity, and personal responsibility in America and abroad.
Principles
• Philanthropic freedom is essential to a free society.
• A vibrant private sector generates the wealth that makes 
philanthropy possible.
• Voluntary private action offers solutions for many of society’s most
pressing challenges.
• Excellence in philanthropy is measured by results, not by good 
intentions.
• A respect for donor intent is essential for philanthropic integrity.
Services
World-Class Conferences
The Philanthropy Roundtable connects you with other savvy donors.
Held across the nation throughout the year, our meetings assemble
grantmakers and experts to develop strategies and solutions for local,
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state, and national giving. You will hear from innovators in K–12 ed-
ucation, economic opportunity, higher education, national security, and
other fields. Our Annual Meeting is the Roundtable’s flagship event,
gathering the nation’s most public-spirited and influential philanthro-
pists for debates, how-to sessions, and discussions on the best ways for
private individuals to achieve powerful results through their giving.
The Annual Meeting is a stimulating and enjoyable way to meet prin-
cipled donors seeking the breakthroughs that can solve our nation’s
greatest challenges.
Breakthrough Groups
Our Breakthrough Groups—focused program areas—build a critical
mass of donors around a topic where dramatic results are within reach.
Breakthrough Groups become a springboard to help donors achieve
lasting results with their philanthropy. Our specialized staff assist grant-
makers committed to making careful investments. The Roundtable’s
K–12 education program is our largest and longest-running Break-
through Group. This network helps donors zero in on the most prom-
ising school reforms. We are the industry-leading convener for
philanthropists seeking systemic improvements through competition
and parental choice, administrative freedom and accountability, stu-
dent-centered technology, enhanced teaching and school leadership,
and high standards and expectations for students of all backgrounds.
We foster productive collaboration among donors of varied ideological
perspectives who are united by a devotion to educational excellence.
A Powerful Voice
The Roundtable’s public policy project, the Alliance for Charitable Re-
form (ACR), works to advance the principles and preserve the rights
of private giving. ACR educates legislators and policymakers about the
central role of charitable giving in American life and the crucial impor-
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tance of protecting philanthropic freedom—the ability of individuals
and private organizations to determine how and where to direct their
charitable assets. Active in Washington, D.C., and in the states, ACR
protects charitable giving, defends the diversity of charitable causes,
and battles intrusive government regulation. We believe that our na-
tion’s capacity for private initiative to address problems must not be
burdened with costly or crippling constraints.
Protection of Donor Interests 
The Philanthropy Roundtable is the leading force in American philan-
thropy to protect donor intent. Generous givers want assurance that
their money will be used for the specific charitable aims and purposes
they believe in, not redirected to some other agenda. Unfortunately,
donor intent is usually violated in increments, as foundation staff and
trustees neglect or misconstrue the founder’s values and drift into other
purposes. Through education, practical guidance, legislative action,
and individual consultation, The Philanthropy Roundtable is active in
guarding donor intent. We are happy to advise you on steps you can
take to ensure that your mission and goals are protected.
Must-Read Publications
Philanthropy, the Roundtable’s quarterly magazine, is packed with
beautifully written real-life stories. It offers practical examples, inspi-
ration, detailed information, history, and clear guidance on the differ-
ences between giving that is great and giving that disappoints. We also
publish a series of Guidebooks which provide detailed information on
the very best ways to be effective in particular aspects of philanthropy.
These Guidebooks are compact, brisk, and readable. Most focus on
one particular area of giving—for instance, Catholic schools, support
for veterans, anti-poverty programs, environmental projects, and tech-
nology in education. Real-life examples, hard numbers, management
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experiences of other donors, recent history, and policy guidance are
presented to inform and inspire savvy donors.
Join the Roundtable Today
When working with The Philanthropy Roundtable, members are better
equipped to achieve long-lasting success with their charitable giving.
Your membership with the Roundtable will make you part of a potent
network that understands philanthropy and strengthens our free 
society. Philanthropy Roundtable members range from Forbes 400 
individuals and the largest American foundations to small family 
foundations and donors just beginning their charitable careers. Our
members include:
• Individuals and families
• Private foundations
• Community foundations
• Eligible donor advisors
• Corporate giving programs
• Charities which devote more than half of their budget to 
external grants
Philanthropists who contribute at least $50,000 annually to charitable
causes are eligible to become members and register for most Round-
table programs. Roundtable events provide you with a solicitation-free
environment.
For more information on The Philanthropy Roundtable or to learn
about our individual program areas, please call (202) 822–8333 or
email main@PhilanthropyRoundtable.org.
Transparency in Philanthropy
PRINCIPLES OF PHILANTHROPY
Titles in this series available from The Philanthropy Roundtable:
How Public Is Private Philanthropy?
Separating Reality from Myth
Evelyn Brody and John Tyler
Transparency in Philanthropy:
An Analysis of Accountability, Fallacy, and Volunteerism
John Tyler
John Tyler
P R I N C I P L E S  O F  P H I L A N T H R O P Y
Transparency 
in Philanthropy
An Analysis of Accountability, Fallacy, and Volunteerism
Regulatory mandates for transparency in philanthropic giving are often touted
as an unmitigated good. Private foundations have long been obligated to pro-
vide certain types of transparency—the types that are required by the federal
tax system and, to a lesser extent, by state laws aimed at maintaining the in-
tegrity of donor intent. But today’s calls for more transparency argue that it is
a good unto itself—that transparency is needed to ensure that philanthropy
serves “public purposes,” that transparency will counteract a purported “power
asymmetry” between donors and grantees, and that it is necessary to evaluate
philanthropic effectiveness. In this book, John Tyler critically scrutinizes both
legal and practical aspects of these rationales for increased transparency. He
also challenges calls for government intervention, including those that seem
to presume the legitimacy of transparency as a fundamental principle in itself
instead of a dependent value in service to other objectives that must them-
selves be legitimate. Along the same lines, he dissects the most frequently as-
serted objectives for government mandates and reveals deeply rooted,
potentially insurmountable problems with the practical pursuit of those objec-
tives. Tyler argues that American philanthropy is at its best when donors, with
their wide range of charitable purposes, can freely choose to employ the kinds
of transparency that enable them to accomplish their goals. To this end, he also
offers thoughtful advice about how foundations might, in pursuit of their mis-
sion, provide measured transparency on a voluntary basis.
John Tyler is general counsel and corporate secretary at the Ewing Marion
Kauffman Foundation.
Free copies of this book are available to qualified donors. An e-book version is available from major online booksellers.
PhilanthropyRoundtable.org
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